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INTRODUCTION
The  Iraqi Constitution's designation of Islamic  law as "a source  of
law" placed  the issue  of Islamic-law's  role in  new democracies  at the
forefront  of the  debates  on  "Islamic  constitutionalism."'   Although
the  meaning of this latter phrase  is  itself open  to  debate,  at a  mini-
Intisar A. Rabb  received  a J.D. from  Yale  Law School,  an  M.A. in Near  Eastern  Studies
from  Princeton  University, and a  B.S. in Arabic and  Government from  Georgetown  Uni-
versity.  She is  a 2007-2008  Prize Fellow at Princeton  University's  Center for Human  Val-
ues  and  a doctoral  candidate  in  the  University's  Department of Near Eastern  Studies,
where  she  is  completing  a  dissertation  on  legal interpretation  in American  and  Islamic
law.  All  translations  from  Arabic,  Persian,  and French  are  her  own,  unless  otherwise
noted.  Sincere  thanks  are  due  to James  Q. Whitman,  as  well as  Anthony T.  Kronman,
Chibli  Mallat, Daniel  K. Markovits,  Kim Lane  Scheppele, Rashid  Alvi,  Nusrat Choudhury,
Monica Eppinger, and Adnan Zulfiqar for their generous  feedback on this Article.  I  am
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The  constitutions  of  twenty-five  member  countries  of  the Organization  of the  Islamic
Conference  (OIC) incorporate  some form  of Islamic  law:  Afghanistan,  Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh,  Brunei,  the  Comoros  Islands,  Egypt,  Iran, Jordan,  Kuwait,  Libya,  Malaysia,
the Maldives,  Morocco,  Oman, Pakistan,  Palestine  (transitional  law),  Qatar,  Somalia, the
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United  Arab Emirates, Yemen,  and formerly,  Iraq.  For the full
list  of  OIC  countries,  see  the  OIC  official  website,  http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/
member  states.asp  (last  visited  Feb.  22,  2008).  Saudi  Arabia  may  be  counted  as  the
twenty-sixth, although  it has no formal constitution;  its functional equivalent  is a basic law
that specifies the  Qur'jn as  its constitution  and shart'a as  its law.  In addition,  five  tIC-
member states permit courts to apply Islamic  law in  matters of  personal  status:  the Gam-
bia,  Indonesia,  Lebanon, Nigeria,  and Senegal.  Several  non-OIC,  non-Islamic  constitu-
tional  states  also convene  sharf'a courts  or permit  their courts to apply  Islamic personal
status  laws  for their  Muslim  minority populations,  for example,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  India,
Israel,  Kenya, the  Philippines,  Singapore,  Sri  Lanka, Tanzania,  and in  some cases,  West-
ern  countries like  the United  States.  See, e.g.,  Asifa Quraishi  & Najeeba  Syeed-Miller, No
Altars:  A  Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in WOMEN'S  RIGHTS  & ISLAMIC
FAMILY  LAW:  PERSPECTIVES  ON  REFORM  177,  188-211  (Lynn  Welchman  ed.,  2004)  (de-
scribing the application of Islamic law to marriage and divorce proceedings  in the United
States and discussing its enforceability  in court).JOURNAL OF CONSTIT17ONAL LAW
mum it refers to a  modern  governing structure  of limited  powers in
which a written constitution designates  Islamic law as a source of law.2
More  than  two years  after  its ratification,  there  has been  little  to
no  headway  toward  detailing  the  mechanisms  to  be  employed  for
fleshing  out Iraq's constitutional  skeleton.  To  be  sure, functioning
political  processes  require  domestic  security-which  has  been  lack-
ing-before  the  government  can  turn  to  constitutional  rule-of-law
questions under a state of non-emergency.  But after security,  consti-
tutional and  rule-of-law  issues are  the next big questions  facing Iraq.
A  central component of these  questions concerns  the role of Islamic
law.
Existing  debates  over  the  viability  of  Islamic  constitutionalism
question  whether a democratic state  that constitutionally draws upon
Islamic  law  is possible,  particularly  when liberal  democratic  and hu-
man  rights  norms  are juxtaposed  against  uncompromising  formula-
tions of archaic rules of Islamic law.3  Such juxtapositions  are unhelp-
ful.  A  conception  of  Islamic  law  as  a  monolithic  body  of religio-
ethical rules removed from the legal interpretive  process precludes  a
discussion  of the  real  issues  at  stake  in  Islamic  constitutionalism4:
2  Constitutional  law scholars  differ on  the definition of "constitutionalism" as much as  they
differ on the precise definition of a constitution  or of democracy.  Without entering these
debates,  this definition  of Islamic constitutionalism  draws on basic conceptions of "consti-
tution" and couples them with Islamic law incorporation.
3  See, e.g.,  Hannibal  Travis,  Freedom or Theocracy?:  Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3
NW.  U.J.  INT'L HUM.  RTs.  4,  2  (2005),  available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
journals/jihr/v3/4/travis.pdf  (arguing  that  Islamic  constitutionalism  is  inherently  un-
democratic  and that  by  incorporating  Islamic  law into  their constitutions,  Iraq  and  Af-
ghanistan  "may  become  enduring  and  universally  recognized  Islamic  fundamentalist
states" that will violate women's rights and end driving privileges in particular).
4  The  earliest treatments  of Islamic  law in Western  literature, such  as those by I.  Goldziher
(in  the  1880s and  1890s),  G.H. Bousquet  (in the  1940s),  andJ. Schacht  (in  the  1950s),
define Islamic law as sacred  ritual law different  from the definition  of law in  the sense  of
Western  positive  law.  See,  e.g.,  BABER JOHANSEN,  Muslim Fiqh  as a Sacred Law:  Religon,
Law  and Ethics  in  a  Normative System,  in  CONTINGENCY  IN  A  SACRED  LAW:  LEGAL  AND
ETHICAL NORMs IN THE MUSLIM FIQH  1, 44-56  (1999).  Max Weber adopted those views in
his analysis  of Islamic law  as "procedurally  irrational"  religious  law, which  is largely  ho-
mogenous,  has no  practical  relevance outside  of liturgical  acts  and personal  status, and
which therefore does not constitute a proper subject for comparison  to Western  legal sys-
tems.  Id. at 48-51.  More recently, scholars  of Islamic  law in the humanities, drawing on
primary  Islamic  legal sources,  have  revised  this view  as  they discover  complexities  in  Is-
lamic  law and jurisprudence.  Developments  in the legal  academy  in  comparative  legal
scholarship  have  been  slower; Weber's formulation  persists  likely because  of the hereto-
fore inaccessibility of many primary sources for Islamic law and the dearth of studies  that
draw upon them  in  the secondary  literature.  For a thoughtful  treatment of comparative
legal  studies  that  attempts  to  move  beyond Weberian  categories  for  Islamic  and  other
non-Western  legal  systems, see generally  H.  PATRICK  GLENN,  LEGAL TRADITIONS  OF THE
WORLD  (2004).  For a critique of "ahistoricistjurisprudence" of Islamic law that conceives
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modes of legitimate and authoritative  interpretation and possibilities
for laws  that forward  rule-of-law values and that can  resolve potential
tensions between democratic and religious accomodation concerns.
More specifically,  the central questions that Islamic constitutional-
ism  evokes  in  the  context  of lawmaking  and  adjudication  concern
how to interpret Islamic  legal texts within the particular governmen-
tal arrangement  outlined by  the constitution and executed by institu-
tional actors.  In other words,  how is  law determined in light of both
structural  considerations  (which institutional  bodies legitimately  leg-
islate or adjudicate)  and methodological  ones  (which legal  processes
can legislators and adjudicators  legitimately employ)?
5  What does the
incorporation  of Islamic  law  into  the  constitutional  scheme  add  to
that  dynamic?  In  addressing  these  questions  with  respect  to  Iraq's
emerging form  of Islamic constitutionalism,  this Article will consider
the  role of Islamic  law  as it  relates  to  popular  sovereignty  ("We  the
People")  and juristic input ("We  the Jurists")6 in the legal process.  It
does  so with  respect to  Islamic  theories  of governance  and  in  com-
parative constitutional  perspective  by analyzing how existing constitu-
tional states have negotiated interpretive processes under the aegis of
Islamic constitutionalism.
This Article  proceeds  in  four Parts,  each examining one  of four
central questions concerning  Islamic law's  role  in governmental  and
of the law as a monolith detached  from historical circumstances,  see Anver  M. Emon,  The
Limits of Constitutionalism in the Muslim World:  History and Identity in Islamic Law, 4-5, 35-
36  & n.10  (N.Y.  Law Sch. Islamic Law & Law of Muslim World, Working Paper No. 08-09,
n.d.),  available  at http://www.ssrn.com/paper=1086767.
5  By legitimacy or validity, I refer  to the legal positivist's "rule of recognition"  as articulated
by  H.L.A. Hart, for the notion of the legal sources and process of interpretation  that par-
ticipants  and actors in  any legal  regime  recognize  as  authoritative  and valid,  and  there-
fore legitimate.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 100-10  (2d ed. 1994).
6  Throughout  this Article,  I use  "jurist" to refer  to  an expert  of Islamic  law  who has  com-
pleted  a program  of legal  training through  which  he or she  gains  the authority to inter-
pret  Islamic legal sources and issue legal  opinions.  Historically, jurists derived authority
not through state appointments, but through legal acumen as recognized in scholarly cir-
cles  as well as amongst  the populace  who follow their edicts.  Juristic formulations  of the
law issue  through formal judicial  decisions, extra-judicial  legal  opinions, and expositions
of the law in  legal  treatises.  Without delving into the various  differences  between  types
and  ranks  of jurists,  my  usage  of the  term encompasses  scholars  who  fall  under several
headings  in  Arabic-Islamic  legal  terminology:  faqfh  (legal  specialist,  also jurist),  "1im
(scholar),  mufif  (jurisconsult),  u&F.  or mujtahid (jurist or jurisprudential  specialist),  or
marja' (exemplar).  Historically,  any one of these  individuals, or perhaps  a lesser-ranked
"lawyer,"  could serve  as a state-appointed judge  (qadf),  who typically consulted  with a ju-
rist (if he was not himself a skilled jurist) on difficult questions of law.  For different rank-
ings ofjurists, see WAEL B. HALLAQ,  AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY AND  CHANGE  IN ISLAMIC LAW
1-23  (2001).
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legal  processes  in  an  Islamic  constitutional  regime:  (1)  How  much
consideration  does  the constitutional  text afford Islamic  law?  (scope
of Islamic  legal  consideration);  (2)  What  is  the  content  of Islamic
law?  (nature and substance  of Islamic  law);  (3)  Who decides?  (institu-
tional  decision-makers);  and  (4)  How?  (case  study of recent  Moroc-
can Islamic family law reforms).
Thus,  Part I  examines  the  text of the new  Iraqi  Constitution,  de-
scribing the way  in which  it incorporates  Islamic  law,  human  rights,
and  democratic  norms.  To  better understand  the  form  of Islamic
law-incorporation  specific  to  Iraq,  I  compare  the  Islamic  law  provi-
sions of the country's  new Constitution  (ratified in 2005)  to its Tran-
sitional one, as well as to other incorporations  of Islamic  law in other
countries  in  the  region.  This survey  reveals  that the  constitutional
drafters reinstated a type  of Islamic constitutionalism  that centers on
Islamic law even as they left many issues of interpretation  and institu-
tional arrangement open.
Part II  discusses  the nature  and substance of the Islamic  law that
the  Constitution seeks  to  incorporate  into  its legal  scheme.  I  begin
with  a  description  of the  historical  development  of Islamic  law,  to-
gether with  a discussion of its foundational sources  and the interpre-
tive processes jurists use  to  derive substantive law.  I then  apply that
general understanding to the form that Islamic law adopts in modern
state-institutional  contexts,  each  of  which  involves  questions  of
whether and how Islamic law is codified.  In that regard,  I review the
heated  debate  in  Iraq  that arose  regarding whether  to  keep  Islamic
family  law codified  (as  in pre-Saddam  Iraq)  or to replace  it with un-
codified laws (in line with a proposal from post-Saddam  Iraq).
Part III  examines  theoretical  and  descriptive  models  of  Islamic
constitutionalism  in  order  to  assess  the  roles  that jurists  can  or do
play  in the  legal  process  around issues  of interpretation.  Arguably,
jurists-as the  historical interpreters  of Islamic  law-act as  a Fourth
Branch
7  to  traditional  government's  three  branches,  particularly
where  the latter permits jurists to play a formal institutional  role.  In
the process of negotiating the relationship  between the  two, it is here
that  tensions  between  modern  liberal  democratic  sensibilities  and
traditional  Islamic  legal  norms  may  play  out.  In  the  interpretive
Note  that this  conception  of the  "Fourth  Branch"  does  not suggest a formal  branch  of
government.  Rather, the reference is to a non-government entity that influences the con-
stitutionally defined  legislative,  executive,  and judicial  branches.  In America, the Fourth
Branch has been  used foremost to refer to the media.
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process,  who  makes  the  ultimate  decision:  "We the  People" or  "We
the Jurists"?
Analyzing existing practices,  I distinguish between  three different
types of constitutionalization  of Islamic law:  dominant constitutionaliza-
tion-where  a constitution  explicitly  incorporates  Islamic  law  as  the
supreme  law of the land;  delegate constitutionalization-where  a consti-
tution incorporates Islamic  law but delegates its articulation  to the ju-
rists;  and  coordinate constitutionalization-where  a  constitution  incor-
porates  Islamic  law,  laws of democratic  processes, and liberal  norms,
placing  them  all  on  equal footing.  Iran  is an  example  of the  first,
where jurists  effectively  control  the  government  and  all  interpretive
legal decisions;  Gulf Arab states are an example of the second, where
interpretive authority over Islamic family law in particular is vested in
the juristic classes; and Egypt and Morocco are examples of the third,
where the government and interpretive decision makers have  devised
schemes  of differing  relationships  with  the jurists.  I  conclude  with
the observation  that coordinate  constitutionalization  appears both to
be  the closest fit to Iraq's  skeletal constitutional  scheme and  to have
the best institutional potential for yielding positive legal outcomes  in
that context.
Part IV examines with more  detail how interpretation  occurs  in a
system  of coordinate constitutionalization  through  the lens of recent
Moroccan  reforms to Islamic family law.  Arguably, Morocco presents
a  useful  model  for  conceptualizing  legislative  debates  that  will  no
doubt arise  in Iraq because, descriptively, both systems fall under the
rubric  of coordinate  Islamic  constitutionalization;  the juristic classes
who  make  up the  "Fourth  Branch"  are strong  in both  systems;  and
normatively,  the  Moroccan  reforms  have  been  lauded  domestically
and  internationally  as  a successful,  self-conscious  attempt to  harmo-
nize Islamic law with democratic and human rights norms.
Before  proceeding to the main body of this Article, it is worth ex-
plaining  the focus  on  family  law  in  the  case  studies  herein.  Oddly
enough,  discussions  of Islamic  law  and  constitutionalism  often  re-
volve around questions of personal status.  This  focus  is odd for stu-
dents of American law because in the American context, family law is
marginal to constitutional legal theory unless it invokes significant
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questions of privacy rights."  It is  also odd for students of Islamic  law,
because while  family law fills  a major chapter in  classical treatises  on
Islamic  law,  it has not been considered  "constitutional" in  the  sense
of forming one of the issues central to Islamic legal theory.
Yet,  the  centrality  of family  law in modern  discussions  of Islamic
constitutionalism  has an historical  explanation.  With  the rise  of the
independent  nation-state  in the Muslim  world,  in many countries an
Islamic  legal order was replaced  by hybrid  legal systems:  mixtures of
French  or British  codes,9 classical  Islamic substantive  law, 0 and tradi-
8  The  most prominent examples of this are  the debates  over reproductive  rights, sodomy
laws,  civil  unions, and  gay marriages.  See,  e.g.,  Lawrence  v.  Texas, 539  U.S.  558, 578-79
(2003)  (invoking liberty and privacy interests  as a basis for invalidating  the Texas Homo-
sexual Conduct Act); id. at 579  (O'Connor, J.,  concurring)  (applying an equal  protection
analysis);  Roe  v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113,  152-54  (1973)  (recognizing a constitutional  privacy
interest  in  a  woman's  qualified  right  to  terminate  her pregnancy);  see  also William  N.
Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence 'sJurisprudence  of Tolerance: Judicial  Review  to Lower the Stakes of Iden-
tity Politics, 88  MINN.  L. REV.  1021  (2004)  (describing  Lawrence as limited judicial activism
that referees the divisive debate over identity politics).  For an informative  comparison  of
privacy  in  American  and  Islamic  law, see generally  Seema  Saifee,  Penumbras, Privacy and
the Death of  Morals-Based  Legislation:  Comparing U.S. Constitutional  Law with the Inherent Right
of  Privacy in Islamic  Jurisprudence,  27 FORDHAMJ. INT'L L.  370 (2003).
9  In  line with  their  former colonial  powers,  most Arab countries  adopted  French  codes,
and Asian countries like Pakistan and Indonesia drew upon British codes.  The seat of the
Ottoman  Empire  (present-day Turkey), which was  not colonized, drew upon  Swiss codes.
The  history of colonialism and power differentials  raise  the question whether  the result-
ing  hybrid systems  were  externally  imposed  or  freely  adopted-an issue  that  resonates
with the situation  in present-day Iraq.  See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying  text.  Con-
stitutional  scholars  focusing  on  the Middle  East have  argued  that  the answer  is  some-
where  between  the  two.  In their  view, legal  reformers from  the  Muslim world exercised
legal  agency in  an  attempt to preserve  parts  of Islamic  law  in  the face of the inevitable
dominance  of Western  codes accompanying  domestic  and transnational  demands  for le-
gal  adaptation  in  the colonial  and  post-colonial  periods.  E.g.,  NATHAN J. BROWN,  THE
RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD:  COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997).  For example,
Egyptian  lawyer  'Abd  al-Razzsq  al-Sanhiiri,  who was  trained  in France  and Egypt, was  in-
strumental  to the codification  endeavor for the Arab world;  he formulated  hybrid codes
for Egypt, Iraq, and Kuwait.  Id. at  149-50.  For his views on comparative  law and the new
civil  codes,  see  generally  'ABD  AL-RAZZAQ  AL-SANHORI,  MASADIR  AL-HAQQ  FI  AL-FIQH  AL-
ISLAM!:  DIRASA  MUQARANA  BI-AL-FIQH  AL-GHARBI  [SOURCES  OF  [CONTRACTUAL]  RIGHTS  IN
ISLAMIC  LAW:  A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY  WITH WESTERN  LAW]  (1954);  'ABD  AL-RAZZAQ  AL-
SANHORI,  WAJIZ  Fl  SHAR.  AL-QANON  AL-MADANI  [ABRIDGED  COMMENTARY  ON  THE  CIVIL
CODE]  (1964);  see also Enid Hill,  Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law:  The Place and Significance of Is-
lamic Law in the Life and Work of'Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri,  Egyptian  Jurist and Scholar,
1895-1971, 3 ARAB  L.Q. 33 (1988)  (describing SanhFari's Islamic and comparative  law re-
search  and the civil codes he created using that knowledge).
10  Some  scholars  have  suggested  that Islamic  law in  hybrid  form  has  spelled  the death  of
Islamic  law generally.  See,  e.g.,  Lama Abu-Odeh,  The Politics of (Mis)Recognition:  Islamic
Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52  AM. J. COMP.  L.  789,  790  (2004)  (arguing  that Is-
lamic law cannot be  a "foundational category  for anyone attempting to understand law in
the Islamic world" because  it has been supplanted by hybrid laws); Wael B.  Hallaq, Can the
Shari'a be  Restored?,  in  ISLAMIC  LAW  AND  THE  CHALLENGES  OF  MODERNITY  21,  21-48
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tional  customary  law.  In  these  countries,  foreign  codes  usually  re-
placed  all  aspects  of civil  and criminal  laws  except family  law, which
provided a home for Islamic and customary  laws."  Notably, this  type
of hybridity was not a ubiquitous phenomenon  in  the Muslim world;
nor was Islamic law always  cabined in a family law shelter.1
2  As such, it
would  be  a  mistake  to  limit analyses  of Islamic  constitutionalism  to
family law.  To do so would leave us ill-equipped  to deal with Islamic
(Yvonne Yazbeck  Haddad & Barbara  Freyer  Stowasser eds.,  2004)  (discussing Islamic  law
as a dead legal tradition with the advent of codification and  colonial forms of education).
This  view  reflects  a  formalistic  definition  of Islamic  law  in  its  developed  classical  itera-
tions.  In point of fact,  aside from  Islamic  law's resurgence  among Islamists and in mod-
ern constitutions, jurists continue  to articulate  the Islamic  laws of private affairs  (such as
contracts and financial instruments, personal  status, and ritual laws)  in  non-state forums,
and adherents  continue  to consult  them.  This  arrangement  is not a  radical departure
from  historical  practices,  where jurists  typically  operated  independently  and separately
from  the  state.  Moreover,  Islamic  legal-educational  institutions  through  which  Islamic
law was  perpetuated  gained state support only well  into the third or fourth  century of Is-
lam's advent.  To be sure, the colonial period did little to bolster Islamic law as the domi-
nating legal  order  of the Middle  East; but it is unclear  that it was  the culprit for all de-
cline.  Already  in  the  fourteenth  century,  for  example,  historian  and  sociologist  Ibn
Khaldfin  commented  on what  he viewed  as jurists'  conservative  and non-modern  view of
the world, along with a general decline of Muslim scholarship.  See generally IBN KHALDON,
MUQADDIMA  (N.J.  Dawood  ed. & Franz  Rosenthal  trans.,  1967).  By  the eighteenth  cen-
tury, scholars  like  Shah Wall Allah  al-Dihlawl were  advocating  the renewal  of the Islamic
legal  interpretive  process  (ijtihdd) through  the revival  of Islam's  intellectual  and  educa-
tional systems.  See SHAH  WALT  ALLAH  AL-DIHLAWi,  HUIAT ALLAH AL-BALIGHA,  translated in
THE  CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENT  FROM  GOD:  SHAH  WALT  ALLAH  OF DELHI'S HUJJAT ALLAH  AL-
BALIGHA  (Marcia  Kristina  Hermansen  trans.,  1996).  In  any case,  declaring  Islamic  law
non-existent  in the modern  period  is unhelpful  as it precludes  an analysis  of the contin-
ued practice of Islamic law privately and in state formations, of Islamic legal elements that
appear  so prominently  in hybrid systems,  and of legal issues central  to discussions of  Is-
lamic constitutionalism.
11  For a description  of how and why family  law remained  under the purview  of Islamic law,
see generally Hallaq, supra note 10, at 25.
12  For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran  purport to  rely on Islamic law as a main or exclusive
source  of law generally.  The Maldives  recently  reformed  its criminal  code based  on  Is-
lamic  law; additionally, Northern  Nigerian  states  have also instituted  forms of an  Islamic
criminal code.  Islamic law has been continuously practiced  in  areas of ritual, in some  as-
pects of family law, and in commercial  transactions  in Muslim and non-Muslim  countries
alike.  Islamic  law is also said to fuel the Islamic finance industry,  which has grown  to be a
near-trillion  dollar  industry with  operations  in over seventy  countries, practices  in major
law firms  like King &  Spalding, financial  products  in  major banks  like HSBC,  and mort-
gage  companies  like  Guidance  International  devoted  to  "shar'a-compliant" offerings.
See, e.g.,  IBRAHIM  WARDE,  ISLAMIC  FINANCE  IN  THE GLOBAL  ECONOMY  1,  6  (2000)  (noting
that  the new  Islamic finance  industry comprises  several  banks,  mortgage  companies, mu-
tual funds, securities  firms, and insurance  companies).  But see MAHMOUD  A. EL-GAMAL,
ISLAMIC  FINANCE:  LAW, ECONOMICS,  AND PRACTICE,  at xi-xii  (2006)  (arguing that current
"Islamic  finance"  practices  merely  replicate  conventional  financial  practices  using  pre-
modern  forms  of "Islamic"  contracts  and  in doing  so,  exist  mainly  as  a  form  of rent-
seeking legal  arbitrage that diverge from  the objectives of Islamic law).
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law  in  other  contexts  and would  ignore  the  central  questions  of Is-
lamic constitutionalism  that touch all  spheres of law:  matters of in-
terpretation vis-A-vis institutional democratic  structures.  The focus on
family  law  here  is  functional;  through  it,  I  attempt  to  engage  in  a
meaningful comparative  study of Islamic constitutional polities where
Islamic  family  law  represents  a  common  denominator  to  assess  Is-
lamic legal elements in the civil codes of Iraq and elsewhere.
I conclude  that, while  Iraq  will  chart its  own  path, some  concep-
tual  and practical  frameworks-including  the  Moroccan  experience
with "coordinate constitutionalism"-can  perhaps  be instructive  with
respect  to  considering  difficult  questions  raised  by  Islamic  constitu-
tionalism  in  general  and  how  they might be  resolved  in  Iraq  in par-
ticular.  In effect, the conceptual proposals in theory, and Morocco's
family  law  reforms in  practice,  provide  examples  of modes  through
which  "We the  People" and "We  the Jurists"  coordinate  in  the legal
interpretive  sphere  for the  rule of law in  a constitutional  scheme  of
limited  government  that  incorporates  Islamic  law  without  allowing
static or anti-democratic notions of that law to dominate.
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL  INCORPORATION  OF ISLAMIC  LAW
The  Iraqi  Constitution  establishes  a  governing structure  wherein
Islamic law, democracy, and human rights norms all play a role.  This
Part begins by outlining each  type of clause.  Then,  in contemplating
the scope  of legal consideration  afforded  Islamic  law in  particular, I
offer a textual, historical,  and comparative  analysis of the Islamic law
clauses.  The  textual  analysis  examines  the  possible  import  of the
unique  words  employed  in  the  constitutional  text.  The  historical
analysis highlights the differences between the current Iraqi Constitu-
tion  and  its  predecessor-Iraq's  Transitional  Administrative  Law.
The comparative  analysis  situates  this Constitution against analogous
clauses from  other Islamic constitutions.  Together, these  Parts dem-
onstrate that the Iraqi Constitution's text incorporates  Islamic law but
leaves the details unresolved and awaiting further legislation.
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A.  Textual Structure and Technical Terminology
Three  separate  types  of provisions  govern  the  status  of religion
and Islamic  law in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which establishes itself
as  the supreme  law of the land.
3   One  set of provisions  governs  the
role of religion  and Islamic  law  directly.  A second  set specifies  cer-
tain rights and freedoms  due to every Iraqi citizen.  A third set estab-
lishes the  democratic  nature of the new regime.  The main relevant
clauses read as follows:
Religion and Islamic Law4:
Article  2.1.  Islam is the official religion of the state and a basic source of
legislation.  No  law can be  passed  that contradicts  Islam's settled  [legal]
rules  [or settled Islamic  (legal) rules]  (thawbit ahkom al-Islam).
Rights and Freedoms' 5:
Article 2.1 (c).  No  law can be passed that contradicts the rights and basic
freedoms outlined in this constitution.
Article  14.  Iraqis are  equal before the  law without discrimination  on the
basis of gender, ethnicity, nationality, origin,  color, religion, sect or legal
school  (madhhab), belief, opinion, or social and economic status.
13  2005  AI-Dustair  al-'Irdqi  [Constitution]  art.  13  (Iraq)  ("This  Constitution shall  be  the su-
preme  and  highest  law  in  Iraq....  No  law  that contradicts  this  Constitution  shall  be
passed.").  The Constitution is in Arabic; the translations are my own.
14  Id. art. 2.1;  see also id. art. 10, 29(a).  In addition  to Article  2.1, other provisions that com-
mit  the state  to  protecting religious  sites  and values  include  Article  10  (stipulating that
the "holy shrines  and  religious sites  in  Iraq  are religious  and cultural  entities...  [that]
the state  is committed  to maintain and protect ...  [while]  ensur[ing]  the practice of reli-
gious rights  freely within  them")  and Article  29(a)  (noting that the state  will preserve  the
centrality of the family as a "religious" value).
15  Like  the United  States, Iraq's "Bill  of Rights"  is  spread  over several constitutional  provi-
sions.  For an overview, see  the following provisions:  Article 2.2 (religious freedom), Arti-
cles  14 and 16  (equal  protection), Article  15  (right to life),  Article  17.1  (privacy), Article
20  (political  participation),  Article  37  (personal freedom  and dignity),  Article  41  (free-
dom  of religion),  Article  42  (freedom  of belief),  and Article  44  (provisions  of interna-
tional  human  rights  treaties  to which Iraq  is a signatory so  long as  they  do not conflict
with  the  Constitution).  Other scattered  rights-provisions  include  Article  22.1  (work  for
all that guarantees  a good  life),  Article  29.4 (non-violence),  Article  30  (social  and health
insurance),  and Article  34.2  (free  education).  Finally, Article .2.1(c)  sets forth  a  non-
contradiction  clause for constitutional rights generally.
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Democratic  Process and Rule of Law6:
Article  2.1(b).  No  law  can  be  passed  that contradicts  the  principles  of
democracy.
Article  5.  The law  is sovereign  and the  people are the  sources of power
and its legitimacy.
Read together, the two clauses on "Islam" and "settled Islamic  (le-
gal)  rules"  in  Article  2 incorporate  Islamic  law rather  than Islam  it-
self.  The  constitutional  text  indicates  that  this  is  the  case  in  two
ways-through  one negative implication and one  positive  one.  First,
"Islam"  is  too  vague  a  notion  to  serve  as  a  source  of legislation  be-
cause the term connotes a vast religious tradition with a considerable
amount of internal  diversity. 7  As  a  religion, Islam  refers to  a belief
system  that in  its  simplest  form  entails  three  core  tenets-belief  in
16  Several  democratic  procedural  norms outline  certain  institutional  structures,  provisions
for popular sovereignty, and federalism-limiting  principles (an especially central  and con-
troversial  issue  in  the  new  Iraq).  Provisions  establishing  institutional  structures  and
norms include  the following:  separation of powers  (Article 47),  an independent judiciary
and independent judges  (Article  19 and Article  88),  and a  bar on private or exceptional
courts (Article 95).  Popular sovereignty provisions  include a non-contradiction  clause  for
the  "principles  of democracy"  (Article  2.1(b)),  that  the  rule  of  law  extends  from  "the
People"  (Article 5),  and that laws  and judicial  rulings will  issue in  the name of "the Peo-
ple"  (Article  128).  A  federalism  clause  states that regional  constitutions cannot  contra-
dict the Federal Constitution (Article  120).
17  Muslim jurists  tended  to  adopt a nomocentric  view of religion,  detailing  legal and  advi-
sory-ethical  rules for all  manner of factual and legal topics in their attempts to reduce ab-
stract moral precepts and divine commands to concrete  rules in a public setting requiring
order and rule of law.  See, e.g., Roy Parviz Mottahedeh,  Introduction to MUHAMMAD  BAQIR
AS-SADR,  DUROS F  'ILM  AL-USOL  [LESSONS  IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE]  19  (Roy  Parviz Mot-
tahedeh  trans.,  2003)  (describing  how  the  Mu'tazilite  tradition  associated  with  Basran
'Abi  -Hudhayl divided religious  edicts into  two categories:  those  determinable  by  intel-
lect, and those determinable only by revelation);  see also BERNARD  G. WEISS,  THE  SPIRIT OF
ISLAMIC  LAW  145-71  (1998)  (examining  Islamic  law's  multiple  ethico-legal  injunctions
and its moralistic  bent).  To be sure,  Islamic legal  theory distinguished between issues  of
law, which were proper subjects for juristic expositions, and issues of fact, which were not.
But in  practice,  the  lines  between  the  two were often  blurred.  See Sherman  A. Jackson,
Shari'ah,  Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State:  Some Reflections on Islam, Popular  Rule, and
Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM  INT'L L.J.  88,  94-101  & nn.21-23  (2004)  (citing  IBN  AL-QASSAR,
AL-MUQADDIMA  F1  USOL  AL-FIQH  [INTRODUCTION  TO  LEGAL  THEORY]  (Beirut:  Dar  al-
Gharb al-Islam  1996);  SHIHAB  AL-DIN  AL-QARAFTI,  I  AL-FUROQ,  ANWAR  AL-BUROQ  Fl ANWA'
AL-FURUQ  11  (Beirut:  'Alam  al-Kit5b n.d.)); cf. ABDOLKARIM  SOROUSH,  REASON,  FREEDOM,
AND  DEMOCRACY  IN ISLAM:  ESSENTIAL WRITINGS  OF ABDOLKARIM  SOROUSH  133-34  (Mah-
moud Sadri  & Ahmad Sadri  trans.,  2000)  (critiquing expansive legalistic  notions of Islam
and juristic failures  to harmonize  religious concerns  with justice  and  law's particularistic
rules, and noting therefore  that "religious  law [shari'ah] is not synonymous  with  the  en-
tirety of religion" (alteration in original)).
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God, belief in  the  Prophet, and belief in  the  day of resurrection' s-
and encourages the establishment of ajust order. 19
The  religion  can  therefore  provide  little  legislative  guidance,
unless the Constitution contemplates  legislative  regulations on belief.
It does not.  The Constitution  provides for freedom  of religion  and
belief in  both  inter- and  intra-religious  terms.  Perhaps foreshadow-
ing  the  sectarian  strife  that  now  threatens  the  very  viability  of the
Iraqi  state,  the Constitution  prohibits  discrimination  on  the basis of
religion  or belief with respect to the  many factions into which Iraqis
may  divide:  religious,  sectarian,  or  with  regard  to  legal  school
(madhhab), belief, or opinion. °  It further prohibits groups and even
tendencies that  advocate  accusing  Muslims  of infidelity  to  the  faith."
The negative implication is that Islamic law, rather than Islam, is what
the Constitution invokes as a basis for legislation.
18  All  mainstream  Islamic  sects, both  Sunni and  ShM, agree  on  these  tenets,  though  they
differ significantly in other ways theologically.  See, e.g.,  ABO  HAMID AL-CHAZALi,  FAYSAL AL-
TAFRIQA  BAYNA  AL-ISLAM WA  AL-ZANDAQA  [THE  DECISIVE  CRITERION  FOR  DISTINGUISHING
ISLAM  FROM  MASKED  INFIDELITY]  (1901),  translated  in  ON  THE  BOUNDARIES  OF
THEOLOGICAL  TOLERANCE  IN  ISLAM:  ABC  HAMID  AL-GHAZALI'S  Fay.al al-tafriqa Bayna al-
Islim wa al-Zandaqa  85 (Sherman A. Jackson trans., 2002);  MUHAMMAD  BAQIR AL-SADR,  AL-
MOJAZ Fl USOL  AL-DIN:  AL-MURSIL,  AL-RASOL,  AL-RISALA  [ABRIDGEMENT  OF THEOLOGICAL
PRINCIPLES:  GOD, THE MESSENGER, THE MESSAGE]  ('Abd al-Jabbar al-Rif-5i ed. 2000).
19  See, e.g.,  QURAN  16:90  (commanding justice, good  works, and avoidance  of evil deeds);
id. 4:135  (commanding  believers  to  stand up for justice, even  if it be  against their  own
selves  and families);  id. 5:8  (similar);  id.  7:29 (stating that God commands justice);  id.
57:25  (reflecting on how messengers were sent to instruct humans to establish justice).
20  2005 Al-Dustfir  al-'Irdqi  [Constitution]  art. 14  (Iraq)  ("Iraqis  are  equal  before  the  law
without  discrimination  on the basis  of sex, ethnicity,  nationality, origin,  color, religion,
sect, belief, opinion, or social and economic status.");  id. art. 42  ("Every individual has the
freedom  of conscience  and belief.");  id. art. 43  ("The followers  of every  religion and sect
are  free in the practice of their religious rites, including  [Shi'I]  .lusayniyya rites  [and]  the
administration  of religious  endowments and associated  affairs  as well as  religious  institu-
tions ....  The state guarantees freedom of worship and the protection of [holy]  sites.").
21  Id. art.  7  ("Entities  or trends  that advocate,  instigate, justify or propagate  racism,  terror-
ism, takfir (declaring a  Muslim to be an unbeliever or apostate),  [or]  sectarian  cleansing,
are banned .... ").  As  recent trends  of bloodshed  have  shown,  the specter  of sectarian
vigilantism  makes the practice of takfIr especially dangerous amongst "Wahhsbis" or "neo-
salafis"  in  the mold  of Ayman  al-Zawahiri  or Osama  bin  Laden, who  believe  that  apos-
tasy-and  the  permissibility  or even  obligation  of death  for  apostates-results  from  nu-
merous mundane  activities that were  historically acceptable  in mainstream  Islamic tradi-
tion.  See,  for  example,  the  list  of ten  acts  by  which  a  person  can  be  considered  a
disbeliever  first  announced  by Muhammad  b. 'Abd  al-Wahhab  (eponym  of the Wahhsbi
school)  in  the late-eighteenth  century and updated  by one  of the  foremost thinkers of
Salafi-Wahhabi  thought in the late-twentieth  century, the late  'ABD AL-'Az IZ  IBN  BAZ,  MIN
FATAWA  WA-RASA'IL IBN BAZ  [THE LEGAL RULINGS  AND  OTHER TRACTS BY IBN BAz]  2,  102-
05  (1988),  translated in DEFINING  ISLAM:  A  CRITICAL  READER  § 1  (Andrew  Rippin  ed.,
2007).
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Second,  and  more  pointedly,  is  the  positive  implication  of the
non-contradiction  clause  in  its  use  of two  terms  that  connote  law:
"thawdbit" and "ahkm."  Thawabit (singular thdbit) is discussed in clas-
sical works, but does not play a rule of central importance  in articula-
tions of legal  theory.  With its appearance  in modern  documents  of
law and  state, contemporary jurists have  revisited  the term,  attempt-
ing to link it to the classical tradition.  For example, the head mufti of
Egypt, 'AlJumu'a, explains  that thawdbit are agreed-upon Islamic le-
gal  rules  that  apply  to  all  Muslims,  regardless  of  time  or  place.
Ah  km typically  refers  to legal  rules in both classical and  modern us-
age.23  Together, these  two terms  affirmatively indicate  that the Iraqi
Constitution  has incorporated  Islamic law-rather  than the  religion
of Islam.
22  Jumu'a  compares  thawabit to  the classical  category of unchanging  rules  that  enjoy legal
consensus  (al-mujma'  'alayh),  which include  personal  status laws.  'Ali Jumu'a,  Al-Thdbit
wa-l-Mutaghayyir  fi al-Shaf'a al-Isltimiyya [The Permanent and Impermanent in Islamic Law],  7
AL-MANAR  AL-JADID  [NEW  MINARET]  45-46  (1999).  His discussion  has been  artfully  dis-
cussed by Kristen A.  Stilt in  Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal Sys-
tem,  36 GEO.  WASH.  INT'L L. REv.  695,  744  (2004).  She notes  that, contrary  toJumu'a's
opinion, "[t]here  is  no clear  sense  in  Islamic jurisprudence  that the  thawdbit refer  to  a
fixed and widely  known  list of rules or principles .... " Id. at  744.  Indeed, Muhammad
Bfqir al-Sadr  explicitly  notes  that even  "Islamic  legal rules...  [that  are]  thobit (settled)
can  change in  application,  depending on  contingencies  that may change from  time  to
time."  MUHAMMAD  BAQIR AL-SADR,  AL-FATAWA  AL-WADIHAH  WAFQAN  LI-MADHHAB AHL AL-
BAYr  [CLEAR LEGAL OPINIONS ACCORDING  TO SHI'I.LAW]  13  (1977).
23  Descriptively,  "hukm"  (the singular  of ahk  rm) refers  to the  logical  relationship  between
two  objects,  see  I  MUHAMMAD  'ALT  AL-TAHANAWI,  KASHSHAF  ISTILAHAT  AL-FUNON  WA  AL-
'ULUM  693-95,  700  (Beirut  1996),  but prescriptively,  it  is a theological/legal  rule that re-
sults from  a command,  id.; see also MOHAMMAD  HASHIM  KAMALI,  PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE  140-43  (rev.  ed.  1991)  (explaining  how  rules  develop  from  religious
commands).  Jurisprudence  adopts logic's descriptive  sense when  describing the obliga-
tions  or status  relationships that result  from  certain  legal acts  (azktm  wad'iyya [declara-
tory rulings]),  like the validity of a contract;  it adopts  theology's  prescriptive  sense when
considering the implications of divine commands  for human  obligations  (ahk  m taklifiyya
[injunctive  rulings]),  like  the obligation  to  pay a poor-tax  on wealth.  Jurists  define  it as
follows:  a hukm  is a legal  rule regulating  human behavior  as  a consequence  of a  divine
command.  See WAHBA  AL-ZUHAYLI,  Al-Wasit fi  u§il al-fiqh al-isl&rm  [Compendium on Islamic
Jurisprudence]  34 & n.1  (1965)  (defining  h.ukm  as  "God's divine-law articulation  associated
with the actions of legal-agents"  and citing an identical  definition  in the works of several
jurisprudential specialists).  Injudicial institutions-both classical and modern-a hukm is
a legally  binding court judgment, which  is  distinguished  from  the opinions  (fatwds)  is-
sued by muffs that  have only advisory  force.  See SHERMAN  A. JACKSON,  ISLAMIC  LAW AND
THE  STATE:  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE  OF SHIHAB  AL-DIN  AL-QARAFI  116,  148
(1996)  (clarifying  the  prescriptive  nature  of a  hukm  and explaining  why only  a hukm is
binding).
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B.  In Historical  Perspective
The  import of the  Islamic  law  clauses  here  were  further  consid-
ered in light of analogous  clauses in Iraq's Transitional  Constitution.
The new Constitution differs from the Transitional  one in two signifi-
cant ways.  First, the new Constitution replaced  the clause  stipulating
that "Islam...  is to be considered a source of legislation  (ma.dar  li-al-
tashif')",4 with  the clause stipulating that "Islam  ...  is a basic source of
legislation  (masdar asds li-al-tashd')  .,
25  Dropping  the  words  "is  con-
sidered" and adding "basic" may be taken to suggest that the drafters
of the new Constitution aimed for Islamic law to have a more central
role in the legislative  process and in judicial determinations of consti-
tutionality.
Second,  the  new Constitution replaces  the old  clause prohibiting
laws  that contradict  "the  agreed-upon  (through  consensus),  settled
tenets  of Islam  (thawaibit al-Islam al-mujma'  'alayh) '
,26 with  a  clause
against laws that contradict  "settled Islamic  (legal)  rules.
, 27  The first
change,  replacing  "settled  tenets  of Islam"  with  "settled  Islamic  (le-
gal)  rules,"  underscores  the  focus on  law  rather  than  religion.  The
second  change  omits  "agreed-upon  (through  consensus),"  the  full
implications  of  which  are  unclear.  Consensus  forms  one  of  the
sources  for  definitive  Islamic  legal  opinions,  but historically jurists
have rarely agreed upon the details of legal rulings.  In the absence of
consensus, jurists were  free  to develop  alternative  interpretations  ac-
cording to  their legal  school's methodology  for deriving legal  rules.
The  product  of this scheme  was Islamic  law's  system of legal  plural-
ism:  multiple  interpretations  that were deemed equally valid, so long
as  they  followed  a  valid juridical  interpretive  process  based  on  au-
thentic sources. 8  In this context, the phrase "agreed upon  (through
consensus)"  may have closed the door on extensive juridical  involve-
ment in  determining  the content of Iraqi  state law  relevant  to ques-
tions  of Islamic  law.  For  this  phrase  recalls  terminology  with  estab-
lished  meaning  and-within  those  confines-would  have  narrowed
the juristic sphere of input to a short list of universally agreed-upon
24  Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional  Period  [Constitution]  art.
7, Mar.  8, 2004  [hereinafter  Interim  Constitution],  available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html  (last visited  Dec. 15, 2006).
25  2005 A1-Dustfir al-'Irgqi  [Constitution]  art. 2.1  (Iraq)  (emphasis added).
26  Interim Constitution, supra note 24, art. 7.
27  2005 A1-Dustfir al-'Irdqi  [Constitution]  art. 2.1  (Iraq).
28  See, e.g.,  JACKSON,  supra note 23,  at 142  (defining medieval jurist Shih5b al-Din  al-Qaraft's
concept  of the rule of law as  "the ability to countenance  a plurality of equally authorita-
tive legal interpretations").
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rules.  The replacement of this phrase with a newer, more indetermi-
nate  term,  "settled Islamic  (legal)  rules," could  have  the opposite  ef-
fect, depending  on  (1)  the meaning it ultimately assumes vis-A-vis  the
principle  of consensus  and  (2)  the  relationship  the  state  develops
with  the jurists.  These  issues are  taken up in  Parts  II and Il,  respec-
tively.
C.  In Comparative  Perspective
The  scope  of consideration  for  Islamic  law  can  be  evaluated  by
comparing  Iraq's constitutional  language  with  that of other  Islamic
constitutional countries.  In the twenty-six  countries that incorporate
Islamic  law,2  the  constitutions  typically refer  to "shari'a." Most  refer
to  the  term  "Islamic  shar7'a" (Bahrain,  Libya,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,
Saudi  Arabia,  Somalia,  Sudan,  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  and
Yemen);3°  alternative  terms  include  "Islamic  fiqh"  (Syria)3"  and  "the
principles  of Islamic sharT'a" (Egypt) . Each  of these  formulations
contrasts  with  Iraq's  use  of  "Islam"  and  "settled  Islamic  (legal)
rules. 3   In  addition,  Islamic  constitutions  generally  incorporate  Is-
lamic  law  through  rendering  sharT'a and  its  cognates  "a  (main)
source"  or  "the  source  of law.,
34   Iraq  renders  Islamic  law  "a  basic
,,35
source.
29  See supra note  1.  A  minority  of other constitutions  use  anomalous  phrases that do not
reference  shar'a  directly.  See,  e.g.,  2004  The  Constitution  of Afghanistan  art. 35  ("the
principles  of the sacred  religion  of Islam");  1980 Qdnain-i  Aslsi-yi Jumhuri-yi  Islami-yi  lron
[Basic  Law of the Islamic Republic  of Iran  (as amended)]  art. 4  ("Islamic  criteria");  1998
The  Constitution  of the  Republic  of the Maldives  ch.  1 § 1  ("the principles  of Islam");
1973 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Part IX § 227  ("Injunctions  of
Islam,  as  laid  down  in  the  Holy  Quran  and  Sunnah  of  the  Holy  Prophet");  ch.  3A
§ 203D(1)  (same).
30  2002  Constitution of the Kingdom  of Bahrain art. 2;  1962 Kuwait Constitution art. 2; 1992
Basic  Law of Governance  [Constitution]  art. 7-8 (Saudi  Arabia);  1969  Libya Constitution
art.  8  (for  inheritance);  1996  White  Book:  The  Basic  Law  of  the  Sultanate  of  Oman
[Constitution]  art. 2; 2004 Transnational Federal  Charter of the Somali  Republic  [Consti-
tution]  art.  8  (Somalia);  2005 Constitution  of the Republic  of Sudan  art. 5.1;  2004 Per-
manent Constitution  of the State  of Qatar  art. 1;  1994  Constitution  of the  Republic  of
Yemen  art.  3;  1996  United  Arab  Emirates Constitution  art.  7;  1980  Qnfin-i  Asasi-yi Jum-
hflr-yi  Islam!-yi  Iran  [Basic  Law of the Islamic  Republic  of Iran  (as  amended)]  art.  167
(Iran).  For the full list of Islamic constitutional  countries, see supra note  1.
31  1973  Syria Constitution  art. 3.
32  1971  Constitution of the Arab  Republic of Egypt art. 2.
33  2005 Al-Dustiir al-'Iraqi  [Constitution]  art. 2.1.
34  Bahrain, Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  Qatar, Syria,  and  the United  Arab  Emirates  use  "a main
source,"  and  Yemen  and  Sudan  "a  source;"  Egypt  Iran,  and  Somalia  use  "the  (main)
source" or the "basic source."  See supra  note 30.
35  2005 Al-Dustair al-'Iraqi [Constitution] art. 2.1  (Iraq).
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Iraq's unique  terminology  for "Islamic  law"  and its  avoidance  of
the term sharf'a  likely signals that Iraq aims not to mimic  any existing
form  of Islamic constitutionalism.36  The precise form  of Islamic con-
stitutionalism  that  Iraq  adopts  will  depend  upon  the  form  that  its
government  gives  to  the term  "Islam"  and to  "settled Islamic  (legal)
rules."  Nevertheless,  to the  extent that  all  types  of Islamic  constitu-
tionalization  are  characterized  by a  constitutional  incorporation  of
Islamic law, the experiences  of other Islamic constitutional  countries
in the realm of legislation and legal interpretation may prove instruc-
tive to understanding some of the issues facing Iraq.
II.  NATURE  AND SUBSTANCE  OF ISLAMIC LAW
If Iraq's constitutional drafters aimed for Islamic  law to play a cen-
tral role in Iraqi legislation, what is the Islamic law  (or "settled Islamic
(legal)  rules")  that they incorporated?  Determining the substance  of
Islamic  law  can  be  a  complex  process  because  of its  developmental
history and its internal diversity.  After examining these themes to de-
velop  a general definition of Islamic  law in historical  perspective,  this
Part  considers  them  under  the  modern  rubric  of  Islamic  constitu-
tionalism.  In  this  context, two  important  issues  that  face  Iraq  are
questions dealing with  consensus  and codification.  Despite the new
Constitution's  omission  of an  explicit  reference  to  consensus,  what
role does  consensus  play,  given  its central  place  in  Islamic jurispru-
dence?  Does the  phrase  "settled Islamic  (legal)  rules"  entail  a con-
sensus requirement after all?  And  in the modern legislative  process,
which will either codify laws or leave  them open to juristic interpreta-
tion,  what forms might  Islamic  law adopt in  Iraq?  I will  discuss  the
latter question in light of recent Iraqi history, in which  family law has
been prominent in the codification debate  even before Saddam's fall,
and have  continued  to  figure  in with  the advent of Islamic  constitu-
tionalism.
A.  In Historical  Perspective
Simply put, Islamic  law is law that is either embodied in or derived
from Islam's foundational  legal sources.  There are  two  terms used
36  It  may also mean  that Iraq's  constitutional  drafters  deliberately recognized  a difference
between  shaua  and fiqh.  For this difference, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
37  The four principal  sources of law for Sunnis include  the  Qur'5n, Sunna  (prophetic prac-
tice),  Consensus,  and Analogical  Reasoning.  See, e.g.,  KAMAU,  supra note  23,  at  16-116,
228-305;  BERNARD  WEISS,  THE SEARCH  FOR  GOD'S  LAW  151-258  (1992).  For ShT'is,  they
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to  refer  to  Islamic  law:  sharf'a and fiqh.  Fiqh and  shaii'a often  are
used interchangeably  to  refer  to "Islamic  law,"  both  among modern
and classical  commentators.  The recent trend, however, is to distin-
guish between the two.3
Shai'a is  the  divinely  ordained  "path,"  known  perfectly  only  by
God.  In other words, it is God's will expressed in the ideals of perfect
justice  and  equality.  Fiqh (literally,  "discernment")  is  a  human  at-
tempt to know the sharf'a.  The  human articulation  of the ideal is a
dynamic process that must constantly  be worked  and reworked  to ad-
dress new situations. 3
'  Thus the  law embodied in the revelatory sources
is  shaif'a proper-God's  divine  law  articulated  in  principled  terms.
The law  derived  from the sources is fiqh-the human attempt to under-
stand and articulate  the ideal in terms of particular circumstances  of
individual and social life.
In sum, Islamic law refers to both  the existing body of precenden-
tial substantive  laws of fiqh and the processes through which jurists in-
terpret or update the law in attempts to  better approximate  sha'a
This  conception  of Islamic  law  might be  compared  to  the  sense  of
"law"  in  American  constitutional  law  and  similar  common  law  sys-
tems-a sometimes confusing collection of doctrines and rules, based
on a foundational text, subject to clarification or refinement by quali-
fied jurists endowed with the authority to say what the law is.41
are the Qur'an, Sunna  (normative prophetic and imamic practice),  Consensus, and Rea-
son.  See  HOSSEIN  MODARRESSI,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  SHI'I  LAW:  A  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
STUDY 2  (1984).
38  See  SUBHI  MAIMASANI,  FALSAFAT  AL-TASHRI'  F!  AL-ISLAM  [THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF
JURISPRUDENCE IN  ISLAM]  21-24, 199-200 (Farhat Ziahdeh trans.  1961);  WEISS, supra note
17, at 119-21;  ABO ZAHRA,  USUL  AL-FIQH  291  (Dar al-Fikr  al-'Arabi  1957); Khaled Abou El
Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM  INT'L LJ. 4, 64 (2003).
39  Mottahedeh,  supra note  17,  at 17-18  (explaining  the  development  of jurisprudence  in
Islamic  law,  which  involves  the  human  attempt to  discern  the  Shaia, as  the  path  or-
dained  and  known  only  by  God);  see  also ABOU  EL  FADL,  SPEAKING  IN GOD'S  NAME  32
(2001)  ("The  Sha~f'ah is  God's Will  in an  ideal  and abstract fashion,  but the fiqh is  the
product of the human attempt to understand God's Will.  In this sense,  the Shaif'ah is  al-
ways  fair, just and  equitable, but  the fiqh is only an  attempt at  reaching  the  ideals  and
purposes  of  Shaif'ah (maqd.id al-Shar'Tah).  According  to  the jurists,  the  purpose  of
Shasf'ah is to achieve  the welfare of the people  (tah.  qfq  maosl,  al-'ibad), and the purpose
of  fiqh is to understand and implement the Shaif'ah. The conceptual  distinction  between
Shaf'ah and fiqh was the product of a  recognition of the inevitable failures of human ef-
forts at understanding the purposes or intentions of God.").
40  For further  discussion  of substance  and  procedure  in  Islamic  law,  see  Ann  Elizabeth
Mayer,  The Shaff'ah:  A  Methodology or a Body  of Substantive Rules?,  in ISLAMIC  LAW  AND
JURISPRUDENCE  177-98  (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990).
41  This view of the juridical  role is similar to Chief Justice John Marshall's  exposition  of the
judicial  power "to say what the law is"  in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.  (1 Cranch)  137,  177
(1803).  Chibli  Mallat  makes  this point  with  reference  to the Iranian  Constitution.  See
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Early jurists developed  a system  of jurisprudence  to say what the
law is-a hermeneutical  methodology for  assessing and interpreting
texts  in efforts  to articulate  shaf?'a in  terms of fiqh.  One scholar  has
explained that "it is  essential for the fiqh to be known  on the  human
plane  as accurately  as  possible." 4  Thus, engaging  in jurisprudential
methods  to  derive  the  law  (fiqh)  requires  training  in  both jurispru-
dence and in substantive law.
The  main features  of jurisprudence  used  to mediate  between au-
thoritative  texts  (or  shafi'a) and  derived  legal  rules  (jiqh) involve
three  stages.  Jurists  must identify  and weigh  plausible foundational
sources of law, drawing on a vast body of Qur'dnic and hadith texts as
well  as  a  vast  body  of  precedential  rulings  from  early jurists  and
community  leaders.  They  must  also  determine  the  authenticity  of
those  sources.  While  there  is no doubt about the  integrity  and au-
thenticity  of the  Qur'dnic  text among jurists,  there  is  considerable
doubt as to the authenticity of many J4adths through which the Sunna
is generally known.4 3  Moreover, there  is disagreement about the exis-
tence of consensus-the  third authoritative :source  of law-on all but
a few areas  of law.  There  is also considerable  diversity  of equally au-
thoritative  precedential  rulings.  Finally, jurists  must  weigh  these
sources  and  precedents, attempting  to  arrive  at a  legal  posture  with
respect to a particular issue  at hand.  They do so  by navigating a vast
body of rules from these multitudinous, sometimes divergent, sources
with an eye to coherence. 44
CHIBLI  MALLAT,  THE RENEWAL  OF IsLAMIC  LAW:  MUHAMMAD  BAQER As-SADR,  NAJAF  AND
THE SHI'I INTERNATIONAL  79  (1993)  ("[T]he quintessential  constitutional question  is  who
ultimately holds the power to say what the law is.  In view of the centrality of the shari'a  in
the definition  of an Islamic  state,  this issue  represents  the essential  problem  of contem-
porary Islamic  law.").
42  Mottahedeh,  supra note  17,  at  17-18  (describing  this jurisprudence  (Wi11  al-fiqh)  as  a
"method  of explaining  texts  [that]  gains  authority  as  it  gains  internal  consistency  and
agrees with  theological  ideas").  For a comparison  with American  ideas of legal interpre-
tation, compare citations in  infra  note 44.
43  This doubt led  to the  emergence of the science of hatfth-criticism,  which aimed to distin-
guish between authentic and inauthentic  reports of Sunna.  E.g.,  IBN AL-SALAH,  'ULUM  AL-
.HADITH  (Nfir al-Din  'Itr ed.,  1966).  That  science itself has been  critiqued for  failing to
adequately weed out spurious hadths.  See,  e.g., Johnatha  Brown,  Critical  Rigor vs. Judicial
Pragmatism:  How Legal Theorists and Hadith Scholars Approached the Backgrowth of Isntlds in the
Genre 'llal  al-H  adith, 14,  1J. OF IsLAMIc LAW & SoC'Y 1 (2007).
44  It is in  this sense  that "law" here  is like American  constitutional  interpretation.  See, e.g.,
William J.  Brennan, Jr.,  The  Constitution in  the  United States:  Contemporary Ratification, in
INTERPRETING  LAW AND LITERATURE:  A  HERMENEUTIC  READER  13-15  (Sanford Levinson
&  Steven  Mailloux  eds.,  1988)  (noting that  Supreme  Court interpretations  gain  legiti-
macy  through  presenting coherent  arguments according  to recognized  rules  of interpre-
tation and  that "[biecause judicial power resides  in the authority  to give  meaning to  the
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The  process  is  further  complicated  because  of the  pluralistic  sys-
tem of multiple legal schools.  Over time the legal sources, the organ-
izational  scheme  through  which  jurists  attempted  to  arrange  the
sources into a coherent legal system, and thus the sources and meth-
odologies  for individual jurists'  interpretive schemes  all typically have
come  to  be  accessed  through one  of Islam's  multiple  legal schools.
These schools  by and large represent  different  means of negotiating
the sources, as worked out by expert jurists over the centuries.
Islamic  law proceeded  in  stages,  and grew  in  complexity  the fur-
ther  it moved  from  its  origins.  Originally,  it consisted  of Qur'dnic
and  prophetic  commandments  that  drew  upon,  modified,  or  re-
placed  existing  legal  conventions  in  the  seventh-century  Near  East.
Following Muhammad's  death, four successor caliphs articulated pub-
lic  law  while  a  scholarly  class,  some  of whom  were  Muhammad's
Companions,  some  of whom  were  his  Family  members,  continued
and built upon his teachings.
4 5  For the Sunnis, this class perpetuated
amongst  Muhammad's  Companions,  their successors,  and  their  col-
lective  students;  for  the  ShT'a,  this  class  perpetuated  through  the
Prophet's educated and pious family members (the Imdms) and their
students. 46  Records  from  these  sessions and  the  informed  opinions
that individual scholars issued added to the hadtth corpus and helped
define early law.
This  scholarly,  early juristic  activity  continued  throughout  the
reign of the first Umayyad dynasty  (r. 661-750).  During this time and
Constitution,  the debate  [about legitimacy]  is really a debate about how to read  the text,
about constraints on what is legitimate interpretation");  Sanford Levinson, Law as Litera-
ture, in  INTERPRETING  LAW AND  LITERATURE:  A HERMENEUTIC  READER,  supra, at 155  (af-
firming that the judiciary must adhere to recognized rules of interpretation  for legitimate
interpretation, though noting that such rules are not uniform).
45  On the succession  to Muhammad  as  head of the  Muslim  community  and the first  four
caliphs'  leadership  activities, see generally  1 MARSHALL  G.S. HODGSON,  THE  VENTURE  OF
ISLAM:  CONSCIENCE  AND HISTORY  IN A WORLD  CIVILIZATION  (1974)  (standard  Sunni nar-
rative);  HUGH  KENNEDY,  THE  PROPHET  AND  THE AGE  OF  THE CALIPHATES  (1986)  (same);
WILFERD MADELUNG,  THE  SUCCESSION  TO MUHAMMAD:  A STUDY OF THE EARLY CALIPHATE
(1997)  (alternative Shl'i account).
46  On the  emergence  and  activities  of the  scholarly  classes,  see  Etan  Kohlberg,  Imam and
Community in the Pre-Ghayba  Period,  in  BELIEF AND LAW IN  IMAMi SHT'ISM  25-53  (Etan Kohl-
berg ed.,  1991).  See  also HARALD  MOTZKI,  DIE ANFA.NGE  DER  ISLAMISCHENJURISPRUDENZ.
IHRE  ENTWICKLUNG  IN  MEKKA  BIS  ZUR  MITrE  DES 2./8. JAHRHUNDERTS  [THE  ORIGINS  OF
ISLAM ICJURISPRUDENCE:  MECCAN  FIQH BEFORE THE CLASSICAL  SCHOOLS]  (1991)  (Marion
Katz, trans. 2001)  (tracing the activities of the scholarly class in Mecca  back to at least the
year  661  when  Muhammad's  Companion  Ibn  'Abbfs  moved  to  Mecca  to  teach);
MODARRESSI,  supra note  37, at 29-32  (tracing the scholarly  activities  of the  period  from
the accession  of the first Imam,  'All  (the fourth caliph),  until the occultation  (ghayba) of
the twelfth and final Imfm in 874).
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through  the  early  'Abbasid  dynasty  (r. 750-1258),  proto-schools  of
law developed-regional  circles  of students  who  self-consciously  fol-
lowed a principle teacher who was an accomplished,  scholarly author-
ity  in  their  local  vicinities.  The  eponymous  heads  of today's  main
schools  mostly  lived  during  this  early period:  AbfQ  HanTfa  (d.  767),
Malik  (d.  795),  their student  Shfi'T  (d.  819),  Abmad  b.  Hanbal  (d.
855),  andJa'far al-Sadiq (d. 765).47
In the middle of the ninth century, these proto-schools  developed
into  larger  trends  until  they  formed  full-fledged  legal  schools  (be-
tween  the  ninth and  tenth  centuries),  with  both  positive  legal  rules
and a particular jurisprudential  methodology.  This jurisprudence  in-
cluded identification  and placement of sources in a certain hierarchy
of  authoritativeness  and  primacy,  as  well  as  methods  of  source-
criticism,  primarily of hadith works  that were  gathered  in what came
to  be  known  as  canonical  collections. s  During  this  time, dozens  of
legal schools proliferated;  it was only later that they coalesced around
five  major Sunni schools  (Hanaft,  Maliki, Shdfi'!, Hanbali,  Zdhiri)  and
four ShV'i schools  (Imami/Twelver, Ismd'ili/Sevener, Zaydi/Fiver and
Ibadi) .49  The Zdhiri  school  is said  to  have  died in  the  late eleventh
47  There is a vast literature  on the origins and development of Islamic law.  For an excellent,
succinct treatment that covers both Sunni and  ShiMT  schools, see Mottahedeh,  supra note
17.  For  an  accessible  narrative  that summarizes  many of the  developments  for  Sunni
schools, see  WAEL HALLAQ  THE  ORIGINS  AND  EVOLUTION  OF ISLAMIC  LAW  (2005).  For
other  useful  overviews  of  the  development  of  main  schools  of  Islamic  law,  see
AMASANI,  supra note 38,  at 42  (commenting on  the periodization of Islamic law); id. at
69-86  (discussing  the  Sunni  and  Shi'i  schools  of law);  CHRISTOPHER  MELCHERT,  THE
FORMATION  OF THE SUNNI  SCHOOLS OF  LAW, 9TH-10TH  CENTURIES  C.E.  (1997)  (summa-
rizing other Sunni schools generally).  For more detailed  school-specific studies, see gen-
erally JONATHAN  BROCKOPP,  EARLY  MALIKI  LAW:  IBN  'ABD  AL-HAKAM  AND  HIS  MAJOR
COMPENDIUM  OFJURISPRUDENCE  (2000)  (M5liki school); YASIN  DUTTON,  THE ORIGINS OF
ISLAMIC  LAW:  THE  QUR'AN,  THE  MUWA.TA',  AND  MADINAN  'AMAL  (1999)  (same);  Majid
Khadduri, Introduction to AL-IMAM  MUHAMMAD  IBN IDRIS  AL-SHAFITIS,  AL-RIsALA FT  USuL AL-
FIQH  [TREATISE  ON  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE]  8-19,  21-48  (Majid
Khadduri  trans.,  2d ed.,  Islamic Texts Society 1987)  (Shafi'i school).  For further discus-
sion, see  WILFERD  MADELUNG,  RELIGIOUS  TRENDS  IN EARLY  ISLAMIC  IRAN  93-105  (1988)
(regarding  the Isma-1i  school);  id.,  at  77-92  (regarding  the Ibdi  school);  MODARRESSI,
supra note 37, at 3-5 (regarding the Shi' Imami or Twelver school).
48  The six Sunni canonical  hadith  collections  are those of Bukhdri  (d.  869),  Muslim (d. 874),
Abi  Dawfad  (d.  886),  al-Nas'i  (d. 888),  Tirmidhi  (d.  892),  and Ibn  Majah  (d.  915).  On
the canonical  collections  and works of haath-criticism  in  the Sunni context, see KAMALI,
supra note  23,  at  87-92,  and  JONATHAN  BROWN,  THE  CANONIZATION  OF  BUKHARI  AND
MUSLIM:  THE  FORMATION AND  FUNCTION  OF THE SUNNI HADITH  TRADITION  (2007).  The
four  ShiMi  canonical  hadth collections  are  those of  Kulayni  (d.  941),  Ibn  Babawayh  (d.
991-2),  and  Nasir  al-Din  al-Tisi  (d.  1067)  (two  books).  For  further  discussion,  see
MODARRESSI,  supra note 37, at 3-5.
49  On the  proliferation  and dissipation of the personal  schools,  see  GEORGE  MAKDISI,  THE
RISE OF COLLEGES:  INSTITUTIONS  OF LEARNING IN ISLAM  AND THE WEST  2-4 (1981),  which
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century  with the death of its most prolific scholar,  Ibn Hazm  in 1082,
though there are  indications  that it still has followers  in  the modern
day.  Today, laws from each of these major schools are in force some-
where in the Muslim world or in countries  with large Muslim minori-
ties. 50
The  rulings  of each  legal  school not only  represent  the fruits  of
source-critical  methods  to  address  issues  of textual  authenticity  and
reliability, but also have gained a large measure of precedential value
in both  popular and juristic arenas.  Popularly,  Muslims  tend  to fol-
low  a particular  school  of law  and  look  to jurists for expositions  of
that school's commands and  prohibitions.  For their part, jurists re-
ceive training in substantive  laws and interpretive methodologies  of a
particular legal school, which equips them with the ability to issue rul-
ings  that are  faithful  to  a  certain  school  and/or  its adherents,  and
that cover contemporary circumstances.
Even expert jurists who formally have  attained  a certain rank that
qualifies  them  to reformulate  rules  outside  the  context of any legal
school are  bound  by prqcedent.
51   If such jurists  attempt  to  accom-
modate modern sensibilities, they must contend with traditional views
embodied in the  received  body of precedents  as well  as  the very na-
ture  and  organization  of the  legal  debates.  In  this  regard,  a  legal
treatise  by  the  late  Muhammad  Bdqir  al-Sadr,  who  is  recognized  as
having achieved the rank of expert jurist, is interesting.
52
In the introduction  to his work, Sadr criticizes his fellow jurists for
an over-reliance  on the form  for organizing  and  addressing legal  is-
sues  bequeathed  by tradition.  In  his  view,  most  treatises  are  badly
written  because  they  slavishly  adhere  to  classical  schemes  of topical
organization and employ excessively technical language.  This way of
notes that there were 500 proto-SunnT personal  schools, most of which slowly died out by
the ninth century.
50  For a breakdown  of the geographical distributions, see  Norman Calder et al., Law, in OX-
FORD  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF  THE  ISLAMIC  WORLD  (forthcoming),  available  at
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/eO473#eO473-s0O02.
51  "Expert jurist" here  refers  to mujtahid or mujtahid mutlaq, and is used  to distinguish  the
highest ranks of jurists that the Islamic  legal tradition  formally  identifies.  For the grades
ofjuristic  expertise and descriptions  of the qualifications  necessary to reach the highest
level ofjurist  (mujtahid midlaq), see generally HALLAQ,  supra note 6.
52  See SADR,  supra  note 22.  For his biography, see Mottahedeh,  supra note 17, at 28-33.
53  See SADR,  supra note  22,  at 48-53.  Classical fiqh works  generally  were  divided  into four
major  categories:  ritual  law  ('ibadit),  commercial  transactions  or  "worldly  affairs"
(mu'amaldt), personal status law  (munrkiht, or in  modern  terms, al-aluswl al-shakhsiyya or
qarfn al-'tiila), and  criminal  and  tort law  (iudfd,  "uqfibdt or  jin5t).  Other sections  in-
cluded  civil  and criminal  procedure  (mukhdsanit or  qad.i),  public  international  law  (si-
yar), and "constitutional," administrative,  and  tax law  (al-ahkim al-sudniyya).  For more
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proceeding  is problematic because it is far removed from the realities
and grammar of today's average reader;  it also results in the omission
of certain modern issues altogether simply because  many contempo-
rary discussions were  never brought up in classical fiqh books. 4  Sadr
departs from the classical formulation  to some extent by recategoriz-
ing the major sections of Islamic  law 55 and presenting  general princi-
ples at the start of each chapter, upon which  he then expounds with
specific  examples that include  modern  considerations  in  simple lan-
guage
. 5 6  But the extent of his departure  is limited.5 7  Reform-minded
jurists like  Sadr must always  grapple with  the weight of precedent  in
attempting  to  replace  it with  their  own formulations.  This  requires
convincing arguments as to why new formulations should replace set-
tled rules.  Advancing such arguments  is an ongoing process amongst
similarly minded jurists.
In  Iraq,  the  complex  structure  of Islamic  law  is  further  compli-
cated by the presence of and differences between the Sunni and ShT'T
schools  of  law.  Iraq's  Muslim  population  is  majority  Sh-'i  with  a
Sunni,  mostly  Hanafi,  minority.  Aside  from  the  Qur'dn  and  a  few
well-known  practices, Shi'T and Sunni law recognize  somewhat differ-
ent bodies  of authoritative legal sources. s  These differences notwith-
standing, the major legal rules in the two schools are similar enough
in their  broad  contours,  but can  differ  significantly  in  the  detailed
59
rules in certain areas-such as matters of personal status.
detailed  discussions of these and additional  categories,  see  MAHMASANI,  supra note 38,  at
24-25  (Sunni law)  and MODARREssI,  supra  note 37, especially at chapter 3 (ShV'T  law).
54  See SADR, supra note 22,  at 49-50.
55  His categories  include ritual law (al-'ibadt), commercial and property law  (al-amwal), pri-
vate/civil  actions  (al-suhk al-khass), and  public  law  (al-sutik al-'1mm).  See  id. at  54-57.
Compare these categories  to those of the classical formation,  supra note 53.
56  E.g.,  SADR,  supra note 22,  at 111  (discussing  "Islamic" versus  scientific  determinations  of
the Islamic calendar, which is central  to, inter alia, the debate over whether the new lunar
month begins with the sighting of the moon or by astronomical calculations).
57  See, e.g.,  id. at 221-22  (the impurity of non-Muslims).  Unfortunately,  Sadr was  executed
before he got beyond  the first book, which  was on  ritual law.  His treatment of social is-
sues and public law would have been  much more telling.
58  See supra note 37.
59  See,  e.g.,  Etan  Kohlberg,  Evolution of the Shi'a, in E. KOHLBERG,  BELIEF AND  LAW IN  IMAMI
SHIT'IsM  1 (1991)  (Afar Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot  ed.,  1979)  (noting major differences  in per-
sonal  status  law);  Wilferd Madelung,  Shi'T Attitudes Toward Women  as Reflected in Fiqh, in
SOCIETY  AND  THE  SEXES  IN  MEDIEVAL  ISLAM  69  (Afaf  Lutfi  al-Sayyid-Marsot  ed.,  1979)
(same).
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B.  In the Context of Islamic Constitutionalism
By  using  the  ambiguous  phrase  "settled  Islamic  (legal)  rules,"
Iraq's  constitutional  drafters  delegated key questions about the form
that the  law will  assume  to  later decision  makers.  Specifically,  they
left  it  for  others  to  clarify  whether  "settled  Islamic  (legal)  rules"
equals  absolute consensus, whether they intended for that consensus
to  arise amongst jurists  or elected  politicians,  and  whether the  "set-
tled" rules should be codified.
1.  Consensus
As  noted, the new Iraqi  Constitution's  omission of "agreed upon
(through  consensus)"  from  the incorporation  of "settled Islamic  (le-
gal)  rules"  may  mean  that Iraqi judges  or jurists  are not limited  to
operating  solely within  the  confines  of past juridical  consensus  but
may exercise  some amount of discretion  in saying what the law is with
respect to  a number of factors relevant in the  present day.6 0  Despite
the  omission of the term  "consensus," questions  closely relevant to  it
will still arise for at least two  reasons.  First,  as noted, consensus  con-
stitutes  one  of the  four sources  of Islamic  law  for both  Sunn  and
ShVI  Schools.6'  Second,  classical  discussions  of Islamic  political  the-
ory  list the  application  of Islam's  clear legal  rules-including  those
subject to consensus-as  one of the Islamic head-of-state's  core  obli-
gations.  The difficulty  with  this  doctrine  in  the context  of Islamic
constitutionalism  enters  in the  determination  of whether  consensus
has been reached on particular areas  and how this relates to the head
of  a  democratic constitutional  state  merely  concerned  with  but  not
compelled by Islamic  law.
63
60  Lisa Hajjar mentions some of those factors:  variations in Islamic legal interpretation that
reflect  the lack  of broad  consensus  in  the Muslim  community, the relationship  between
religious law and state power  (i.e.,  the question  posed by Islamic constitutionalism),  and
"the influence  of trans-national  discourses  and movements,"  especially in "Islamization"
and human rights initiatives.  Lisa Hajjar, Domestic Violence and Shatf'a: A  Comparative Study
of Muslim Societies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, in WOMEN'S  RIGHTS &  ISLAMIC  FAMILY
LAW:  PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM  237-38  (Lynn Welchman  ed., 2004).
61  See supra note 37.
62  E.g.,  IMAM  AL-HARAMAYN  AL-JUWAYNI,  GHIYATH  AL-UMAM  FI  ILTIYATH  AL-ZULAM  17,  46-47
(Dr al-Da'wah  1979)  (explaining that clear Islamic rules or "legal certainties" (qaumti' al-
shar') encompass three categories:  (1)  clear scriptural  text that needs  no interpretation,
(2)  reports  so widespread  that there  is  no possibility of corrupted  transmission  and  no
doubt as  to their origin, and  (3)  settled consensus  (ijmd'mun'aqad)).
63  Scholars  debate whether  universal consensus  could exist on any but a  few fundamentals.
Amongst Sunnls, consensus  originally  referred  to the  agreement of a  few scholars  in  a
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As a practical  matter, the indefinite status of consensus  or "settled
Islamic  (legal)  rules" leaves  open  the question  of which,  if any,  con-
tested rules warrant  legal  cognizance  under  Iraq's formulation  of its
Islamic constitutional scheme.  On the one hand, if the state chooses
to adopt the majority opinions ofjust one of the several  legal schools,
predictability  of the law would  no doubt increase,  at the expense  of
representative  democracy and protections  for minority sects.  Such  a
scheme  would require  a coherent justification  for privileging one le-
gal  school  amongst  a  populace  that  affiliates with  multiple  (equally
valid)  legal  and  sectarian  identities.64  Recent  history has  illustrated
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of such a task.  Iraq's first family law
code, which  was drafted  in  1953  by  Egyptian legal  reformer  Sanhflri
and which  privileged  Hanafi  law,  led  to  massive  opposition  on  the
part of the Shi'ijurists.  This strategy of privileging the rules of a sin-
gle legal school  appears to be a purely modern consequence  of state-
dominance over a united legal regime.
On the  other hand,  state recognition  of the valid  interpretations
of all  or multiple legal  schools  likely will decrease  predictability, but
increase  opportunities  for popular support and perhaps  for the vin-
dication of minority interests.  This option would require the difficult
task  of working  out  a  scheme  that  accommodates  legal  pluralism.
There  is some precedent for  this.  For example, in early  Islamic his-
tory,  Muhammad  and  succeeding  scholars  and  community  leaders
adhered  to a doctrine of allowing  minority religious interpretations,
even  if they cut against  Islamic  (state)  law.  This was famously  repre-
certain  locality, as espoused  by Malik,  founder of one of the  SunnT  schools.  See DUTTON,
supra note  47  (discussing  the  methods  used  by  Malik  to  derive judgments  from  the
Qur'an).  Malik's pupil, Shafi'I,  adopted this position but soon  developed it into his  own,
which became the more mainstream notion:  consensus of "the majority of leading jurists
in  Muslim  lands"  for legal  matters  and  the  "agreement  of the  Muslim  community"  on
matters  of fundamentals.  Khadduri, supra note  47,  at 32,  37-38.  It is  worth noting that
Shafi'T's concept is expressed  in a Sunni prophetic  h adith that "my people will never agree
on an error."  Id. at 38.  Taking this statement to signify that the people  represent God's
will  (vox populi, vox Dei),  id.,  the phrase  provides  a basis for Sunni scholars  to  identify Is-
lamic  roots of democracy.  See,  e.g.,  Khaled Abou  El  Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of  Democ-
racy,  BOSTON  REVIEW,  Apr./May  2003,  available at  http://bostonreview.net/BR28.2/
abou.html  (exploring  the  challenge  of reconciling  democracy with  divine  sovereignty).
Amongst the  ShT'a, consensus  originally  referred  to  that of the Imams.  See MODARRESSI,
supra note  37, at 3.  It only gradually came  to  signify that of the jurists.  In both spheres,
the  doctrine  of consensus was  difficult to  apply historically  because jurists agreed  on no
objective  method  for arriving  at or identifying  consensus  beyond  universal  practices  of
the  community.  Khadduri,  supra note  47,  at  38.  In fact,  consensus  was  defined  nega-
tively:  the absence of a claim  against consensus for a particular matter;  all else  was  a de-
rivative Islamic legal rule  open to reasonable debate.
64  See infra text accompanying  note 70.
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sented in the maxim that "to each people are their own valid forms of
marriage,"  by which Zoroastrian  marriages  of mother  to son,  for ex-
ample, were  permitted even though  they were  otherwise banned un-
der  Islamic  law.6 5  The  thirteenth-century  MamlFak  state  (in  modern-
day Egypt and Syria)  convened  a council of the  four schools  of Sunni
law.  And in the Ottoman Empire  (r. 1299-1924),  religious minorities
followed  their own  laws in a  "millet' system,  their  legal autonomy  cir-
cumscribed  to areas that did not offend public safety or public mores.
These examples represent  instances of prior attempts to grapple with
the  questions  of rule-of-law  with no  single  method  or institution for
interpretation capable  of accommodating all of the inhabitants of an
Islamic  regime.  As such,  they are  historical  instances that may be  in-
structive  to  modern-day questions raised by Islamic constitutionalism
in  states  with  diverse  populations.6 6  As  discussed  further  below,  an
important  question  in  either  case  involves  how  the  state  will  access
and recognize valid legal opinions-be they from Muslim jurists, non-
Muslim minorities, or otherwise.
2.  Codification
Given  the structure  of law and  institutions under modern  consti-
tutionalism,  the Iraqi state will  also have  to decide whether to  codify
the law or leave it to juristic/judicial discretion.  Experiences of other
countries  again  offer limited  guidance  on  the  precise  form  that  Is-
lamic personal  status law in Iraq will or should assume.  In analogous
Islamic  constitutions,  there  is  no  correlation  between  the  constitu-
tional  centrality  of Islamic  law  to  legislation  ("a  source"  versus  "the
source")  and the codification of personal status laws.  Some countries
that render Islamic  law "the source" codify the laws of personal status
(e.g., Iran, Egypt, and Yemen),  while others leave personal  status laws
uncodified  (e.g.,  Qatar, Saudi Arabia,  Oman, and  the UAE).  Some
countries  that render Islamic  law "a source" similarly codify personal
status  laws  (e.g.,  Kuwait,  Libya,  Malaysia,  Sudan,  and  Syria),  while
others leave  personal status  laws uncodified  (e.g.,  Bahrain).  The de-
cision of whether to  codify and  the determination  of the content of
the  codification  appears  to  depend  very  little  on  constitutional  for-
mulations of the Islamic  law incorporation and very much on domes-
65  See  SUYOTI  ET  AL.,  AL-WtASA'IL  ILA MA'RIFAT  AL-AWA'IL  17:234  (Maktabat  al-Khanji  1980)
(explaining  that  the  principle  is  a particular  statement of a more  general  rule:  "Every
people  who believes  in something  [according  to  their  religion]  is  bound  by  [that relig-
ion's]  rules"); IBN  QUDAMA,  MUGHNT  (Maktabat al-Q7hirah  1968)  11:36  (same).
66  For another view, seeJackson,  supra note  17, at  102-07.
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tic politics and the local history of the state's relationship with Islamic
law or its exponents.
Some  have  predicted  that  Islamic  family  law  in  Iraq  will  be  un-
codified  and left exclusively  in  the hands  of the jurists, who  will im-
pose  restrictions  on  women's  marriage  and  divorce  rights,  among
other things. 6 7  Iraq does not seem to be on that path.  In 2004, Reso-
lution  137-a proposal  to replace  Iraq's  1958  Personal  Status  Code
with  "shaf'd'  (as  uncodified  family  law)-failed.  In  designating  an
uncodified,  amorphous body of law as the basis for family law, Reso-
lution  137 would  have transferred  personal status laws from a civil to
a  purely  religious  (juristic) jurisdiction.  Women  activists  played  a
prominent  role  in  contesting  the  resolution,  but its ultimate  defeat
likely had to  do with constitutional  and institutional  concerns  about
the role of Islamic law on the grounds  that an  uncodified law would
create  enormous constitutional  difficulties  under the new Iraqi  Con-
stitution.8
The  Iraqi  Constitution  incorporates  Islamic  law,  but it  does not
shift all interpretive  power to jurists or even  to Islamic  law courts.  In-
deed,  the  new  Iraqi  Constitution  does  not even  create  Islamic  law
courts,  unlike  the  previous  Iraqi  regime.  Instead,  it empowers  the
Supreme  Federal Court to rule on the  constitutionality  of all legisla-
tion-which, it is  to be remembered, includes  Islamic law.  The Con-
stitution  specifies  that the  Court will  be  made  up of an  unspecified
number of judges, Islamic legal  experts  (jurists?), and ordinary  legal
experts.  The  legislature  must later determine  the  precise  composi-
tion of the Court by a law  that passes with a  two-thirds  majority par-
67  See,  e.g.,  Travis,  supra note  3,  at  100  (describing  the  plight  of women  in  Afghanistan
dealing  with  restrictions  on their  freedom  of movement,  dress,  and  rights  in  marriage
and  divorce).  But  see  Isobel  Coleman,  Women,  Islam, and the  New  Iraq, FOREIGN  AFF.,
Jan./Feb.  2006,  available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060101faessay85104/isobel-
coleman/women-islam-and-the-new-iraq.html  (arguing that Islamic law incorporation will
not  necessarily  harm  women  because  Islamic  law  can be  interpreted  in  many ways and
that  the  United States  can  help support more  egalitarian  interpretations  by supporting
progressive  Muslim  scholars);  Amira  Sonbol,  Women  in Shari'ah Courts:  A  Historical and
Methodological Discussion, 27 FORDHAM  INT'L L.J.  225  (2003)  (arguing that pre-modern  Is-
lamic  family law was  flexible  and that modern  codes  have  imposed patriarchal  codifica-
tions  of hybrid  narrow  interpretations of Islamic law mixed  with  Western law).  All  this
underscores  the real concern  with  Islamic law incorporation,  which  Kristen Stilt insight-
fully highlighted:  what structure  for legislation  and interpretation will  the  Iraqi govern-
ment devise?  See Stilt, supra  note 22, at 754 (listing a series of questions  that Iraq must an-
swer as it develops its constitutional and governmental structures vis-a-vis Islamic law).
68  For  a  description of how women  activists campaigned  to prevent  Resolution  137,  which
was approved  by  the Interim  Governing  Council,  from  becoming  law, see  http://www.
womenwarpeace.org/iraq/iraq.htm  (last viewedJan. 5,  2006)  (login required).
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liamentary vote.69  Thus, there are a few important points to consider
about  Iraqi-style  constitutionalism  and  Islamic  family  law  that  help
explain  the failure  of Resolution  137.  The Iraqi  Constitution  unam-
biguously  and formally incorporates  Islamic  law;  and  this incorpora-
tion occurred  subsequent to the Resolution 137 debate.  Moreover,  the
existing  family law code-in which  a vote  against the Resolution  was
effectively  a vote  to keep the existing code-was  based on Islamic  law.
Therefore,  the  defeat of Resolution  137-and  its  relation  to the  lar-
ger question  of codification-was  not about the propriety of incorpo-
rating Islamic  law,  but rather  about  how it should  be  done.  It was
about  the  centrality  of juristic  authority  in  Islamic  legal  interpreta-
tion.  To  see  how,  consider  the  perspectives  of the  parties  both  for
and against the Resolution as a means of moving toward legal reform.
Both  supporters  and  opponents  of Resolution  137  desired  some
measure  of reform to existing family laws.  Opponents  (certain politi-
cians  and women's  activists)  may have  wanted  reforms,  but not if it
meant  they would  have  no  say in those  reforms.  Would a  return  to
classical,  uncodified  Islamic  law  mean  that  only  the jurists could  in-
terpret, as historically they have  done?  There was a fear that notwith-
standing  the constitutional  mandate  to uphold both democratic  and
Islamic values, jurists could very well impose  a form of family  law that
was  too  conservative  and  uncompromising  for  popular  tastes  and
against which  the populace  could  do nothing.  Resolution  137 signi-
fied the unchecked  discretion of jurists to determine the  law without
popular,  legislative,  or judicial  review.  It therefore  represented  an
imposition  of juristic  interpretations  on  government  branches  in  a
way  that does not comport with the  democratic processes  for legisla-
tion.
Supporters of the Resolution  (primarily certain jurists) wanted  re-
forms that took juristic input into account.  Theirs was a proposition
of institutional competence:  jurists are best equipped to interpret  Is-
lamic  law.  Their primary  concern  was that the  existing  codified  law
was  skewed because  its provisions were not the  output of a proper  Is-
lamic legal interpretive process.  This complaint followed from earlier
juristic  objections.  Iraqi jurists  had  challenged  the  existing  Family
Law Code  because  it does  not adequately  accommodate  the  Islamic
69  2005 AI-Dustar  al-'Iraqi  [Constitution]  art. 93.2  (Iraq)  (empowering the Supreme Federal
Court to interpret the Constitution);  id. art. 92.2  (specifying that the Court will  be made
up of an unspecified number ofjudges  (qu4dt),  Islamic  legal experts  (khubanr'fi  al-fiqh al-
isivu), and legal experts  (fuqah'  al-qanfin), the composition of which is to be determined
later by a two-thirds majority of the parliament).
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legal pluralism under which various confessional and legal affiliations
have  traditionally  functioned.  For  example,  Muhammad  Bahr  al-
'Ulfim,  a  prominent  Iraqi jurist,  wrote  a  tract  against  the  govern-
ment's  attempts  to  control  Islamic  family  law.  His contentions  still
have  some traction  today.7 0  His  was  a  critique  of Sunni  dominance
over Shl'i law, but the reverse challenge could arise if ShV'1 law comes
to  dominate  Sunni  law.  His  point  was  that  no  single  legal  school
should exclude  another.  Perhaps  the  concerns  of both  supporters
and  opponents  to  the  Revolution  could  be  ameliorated  by some  of
the  balances  that democratic  institutions might  bring  to the  task  of
Islamic legal interpretation for a diverse population.
The family  law debate  raises one final  point worth mentioning-
the extent to which Islamic  constitutionalism  is  indigenous to Iraq.  I
have argued that despite the defeat of Resolution 137, the subsequent
incorporation  of Islamic  law  indicates  that  the  Iraqi  people  (or  at
least the people  purporting  to act on their behalf)  will  tolerate, and
may even  demand, a role for the jurists.  But for democratic and con-
stitutional concerns, they do not want a government and laws that are
within  the  sole purview of the jurists.  It  is difficult  to  attribute  these
outcomes  to  "the  Iraqi  people"  point-blank,  given  that  Iraq's  new
governmental  structure  and  constitutional  project  was  heavily  engi-
neered  by  the  United  States,  is  subject  to enormous  foreign  influ-
ence,  and  continues  to  function  under occupation.  American  com-
mentators  readily admit that democracy  was  "imposed," though  it is
more  difficult  to  assess  the  precise  areas  of foreign  influence  on  Is-
lamic  constitutionalism.7  One might venture to suggest though that
Iraq's Islamic constitutionalism arose from within.
70  See Stilt, supra note 22,  at 751 n.268, 752 n.270 (citing MUHAMMAD  BAHR AL-'ULOM,  ADWA'
'A  QANUN  AL-AHWAL  AL-SHAKHS$YYA  [SHEDDING LIGHT ON  THE PERSONAL  STATUS  LAW]
(1963)  and noting that his critiques are still powerful amongst ShT'i politicians and jurists,
having served as the impetus behind Resolution  137).
71  See,  e.g.,  Noah Feldman,  Imposed Constitutionalism,  37 CONN. L. REv.  857  (2005)  (respond-
ing to  criticisms  of his role,  as a foreigner and representative  of the occupying  force,  in
advising  Iraq's  provisional  government,  but recognizing  that an  Iraqi  Constitution  ulti-
mately  should  be  drafted  and  accepted  by  Iraqis  themselves).  On  the overall  project,
perception  and substance  play a key role to legitimacy  and viability of Iraqi constitutional
law.  See Ash 0. Bfli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building  in
Iraq, 30  YALEJ.  INT'L  L.  431,  445  (2005)  (noting that challenges  to establishing  democ-
ratic rule of law "are further exacerbated  by the fact that any new institutions are liable  to
be perceived as  the products of occupation" and that, "[tjo inspire confidence  in the rule
of law, the legitimacy  deficit suffered by institutions perceived  as external impositions will
have  to be overcome");  cf Gilbert S. Merritt, SeniorJudge,  U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth  Circuit,  Reconstruction  and  Constitution  Building in  Iraq, Address  at Vanderbilt
University  Law School  (Jan.  23,  2004),  in 37 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765,  774, 778  (2004)
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Iraq's jurists, and  leading  Iraqi  cleric Ayatollah  'All  al-Sistdni  in
particular, were  influential in  ensuring Iraq's constitutional  incorpo-
ration  of Islamic  law.72  In  the  Interim Period,  Coalition  Provisional
Authority head Paul Bremer vowed to veto any constitution  in the In-
terim  Period  that incorporated  Islamic  law.73  Sistdni  directly  coun-
tered  this;  he  is  credited  with  insisting  on  the  incorporation  of Is-
lamic law into the Constitution.  With his quiet opposition in a war of
wills with  the American-led  CPA, Sistdni's victory revealed  the latent
and not inconsiderable  power and legitimacy that Iraqi jurists enjoy.
Iraqi jurists are  a strong, independent body with a  long legacy of in-
tellectual  activity  and  institutional  development,  particularly  in  the
ShVT learning center, Najaf.4  They have been  active  in  the political
arena since  at least the Iraqi Revolution of 1958.73  Their victory in fa-
cilitating Islamic constitutionalism  reflects their power and authority;
("[T]he  promise we have  made  to  Iraq [is]  of a constitutional  democracy,  to be held up
as a model in the Middle East....  Bremer has completely botched this job.  There are,  I
think, plausible  reasons for our being there  [in Iraq],  but there is no plausible  reason  in
my view for doing it the way we are doing it.").
72  On Sistdnl's  considerable  influence,  see  Roy P.  Mottahedeh,  Keeping the Shiites Straight,
RELIGION IN THE NEWS  (Summer 2003),  available  at http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/
RINVol6No2/Keeping%20the%2OShi'ites%2OStraight.htm  ("[N]o  other  Iraqi  mullah
possesses  his  learning or piety, and  he  has more  followers  in  the Twelver Shi'ite  world
than any other Source  [of Imitation]  alive....  It will be very hard,  and possibly very un-
wise,  to build a new Iraq without allowing some of the Shi'ite clergy to participate.").
73  SeeJim Krane,  Touting Women's Rights,  U.S. Administrator  Threatens Veto of Iraqi Islamic Law
Measure,  ASSOCIATED  PRESS,  Feb.  16, 2004  (noting that  head  of the Coalition  Provisional
Authority, Paul Bremer, feared  that women's rights would be "rolled back in the interim
constitution...  [through]  Islamic  restrictions");  see  also Stilt,  supra note  22, at  742-44
(noting  how the Drafters of Iraq's  Interim  Constitution managed  to incorporate  Islamic
law into the  Constitution, over Bremer's  concerns, without any of the qualifiers that  he
suggested, like "principles of Islamic Sharia" and "a source of inspiration for the law").  As
discussed  supra Part  II,  the  permanent  Constitution's  incorporation  of Islamic  law  is
worded  with  even  more  particularity.  See  generally L.  PAUL  BREMER  III  & MALCOLM
MCCONNELL, MYYEAR  IN IRAQ:  THE  STRUGGLE TO BUILD A  FUTURE OF HOPE (2006); Noah
Feldman  & Roman  Martinez,  Constitutional  Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment
in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REv.  883 (2006).
74  MALLAT,  supra note  41,  at  38  (noting that the juristic  class is  so strong  and entrenched
that it almost  functions  like  a  quasi-state,  awarding  stipends and  setting  curricula  over
which  the government had no control);  id. at 34-35  ("The jurists are not so much  inter-
preters  of the  law  as  the  exclusive  interpreters of religious  law, of  law  qua religion.  The
uniqueness  of modern  Shi'ism  lies  in  the autonomous  body of Shi'i  mujtahids who  are
vested with  the protection  of the law-and religion-through  their interpretive  power."
(first emphasis added)).
75  Most notably,  the  prominent jurist Muhammad  BAqir Sadr  became  active  in  the Da'wa
party,  see  Mottahedeh,  supra note  17,  30-31;  see  also JOYCE  N.  WILEY,  THE  ISLAMIC
MOVEMENT  OF IRAQI  SHI'AS  73  (1992)  (noting that the  tensions became  violent in  1979,
but that the Iraqi jurists  maintained  a strong presence  because,  unlike the jurists of the
Sunni world,  they remained  relatively independent of the government).
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but the  defeat of Resolution  137 shows  that  there are limitations  to
that power in the context of Iraq's fledgling democracy.
III.  GOVERNMENTAL  DECISION-MAKERS ANDJURISTS AS A FOURTH
BRANCH
A central  claim of this Article is that tensions between government
branches and the juristic class  face  every Islamic  constitutional coun-
try  aspiring  to  a  democratic  government  that resonates  with  its  citi-
zens'  historical  and  religious  sensibilities,  and  that  these  countries
contemplate  some relationship  between  the  groups as  a result.  The
challenge  of Islamic  constitutionalism  is  twofold.  One  challenge
concerns  the  mere  theoretical  possibility  of realizing  a  functional
governmental  structure in which religious norms constitutionally bal-
ance with human rights and democratic norms.  This might seem like
a  challenge  facing  every  constitutional  system  that  recognizes  a role
for or accommodates  religion.  Yet there are added challenges  in the
Islamic  constitutional  context  because  of the  trenchancy  of Islamic
law-an ostensibly religious law-as a source for state law.  Islamic po-
litical theorists have tended to resolve these challenges by dissociating
stilted notions of Islamic law from dominance over state law.
Another  challenge  concerns  the  practical  workings  of such  sys-
tems.  Modern  Islamic constitutional  countries  have each derived  in-
dividual arrangements  in  this regard, with varying degrees  of success
and  functionality.  Notably,  Islamic  constitutional  governments  that
consider  the place  of Islamic  law  invariably have  contemplated  some
relationship  with  the jurists-ranging  from  complete  exclusion  (in
non-Islamic  constitutional  countries  such  as  Turkey)  to  dominance
76 (in  Islamic  constitutional  countries  such  as Iran).  In  this context,
the  body of jurists typically included in  these  countries'  processes of
legislation  and  adjudication  may  be  seen  as  Islamic  constitutional-
ism's Fourth Branch of government.
76  Though  I argue  that all  Islamic  constitutional  countries  must deal with  the  question  of
the jurists'  role,  the same is not true for other Muslim-majority countries, and this argu-
ment does not imply that  the state  relationship with  the jurists  will  be inclusionary.  As
noted, some, like Turkey, are  completely secular,  while others  that purport to  adhere to
Islamic constitutionalism  exclude jurists.  For a list of groupings  in this context, including
non-Islamic constitutional states, see  Constitutionalism,  Human Rights, and  the Rule of Law in
Iraq:  Hearing  Before the  S.  Comm.  on the Judiciary, 108th  Cong.  (2003)  [hereinafter  Iraq
Hearing] (statement of Khaled Abou  El Fadl,  Professor of Islamic Law,  UCLA  School  of
Law),  available  at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=826&witjid=2348;  cf  Stilt,
supra note  22,  at 719  (describing the  tension in Iran between  different populations  who
disagree  about the role of religion in government).
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A.  Conceptual  Frameworks
A  growing body of literature  theorizes  on the compatibility of "Is-
lam and  democracy."  As  stated,  the dichotomy  may be  misleading.
Rather  than comparing  Islam  (a  religion)  to  democracy  (a form  of
governance),  these studies actually query whether support for the no-
tion  of rule  by  the people  can  be found in sources  on  Islamic  tradi-
tion.77  In general,  the studies  conclude  that no  inherent contradic-
tion  exists  by  identifying  the  roots  of  democratic  governance  in
Islamic legal and political thought and arguing that there are ways in
which popular sovereignty can co-exist with divine sovereignty.
7
1
In Iraq's Islamic constitutional context, such  treatments rightly as-
sume that the Iraqi Constitution's  clauses on religion and Islamic law
stand  in  some tension  to the  clauses  on rights and democratic  proc-
77  The  sources  include  two  sets of literature:  Islamic  political  theory  (legal  and  political
texts that draw on Qur'5nic  precepts,  the prophetic  example,  and  historical  practice  in
early Muslim  societies under the caliphate  system)  and Islamic theology  (the dogma  that
posits  God  as  sovereign).  See,  e.g.,  NOAH  FELDMAN,  AFTER JIHAD:  AMERICA  AND  THE
STRUGGLE  FOR ISLAMIC  DEMOCRACY  (2003)  (arguing for the possibility of Muslim  democ-
racies); Abou  El  Fadl,  supra note 63  (providing an  example  of Islamic political  theory);
Jackson, supra note 17  (arguing that Islamic theology  can be  the basis of a democracy,  al-
though such a democracy may not conform to Western models).
78  See supra note 77.  But see Travis, supra note 3,  1 2  ("The new constitutions  of Afghanistan
and Iraq have enshrined  Islam  as  the official  religion and source of legislation, which no
social  policies may contravene.  This codification  of religious fundamentalism  was an  in-
evitable  byproduct,  some  observers  contend,  of the  delegation  of the  nation-building
process  in  both  countries  to  religious  extremists  who  enjoyed  devoted  followings  of
armed  militiamen.").  Abou  El  Fadl, Feldman,  and others who argue  that  Islamic tradi-
tion comports with  democratic forms of governance,  tend to  focus on procedural  forms  of
democracy.  By contrast,  Travis  and others  conclude  that  Islam  and  democracy are  in-
compatible  on  the grounds  that  Islamic  values  are antithetical  to  substantive notions  of
democracy.  While  democracy  has many  different definitions and types,  it is  enough for
our purposes  to  note basic differences between  substantive  and procedural  forms of de-
mocracy.  In my view, the procedural  focus  is  a more solid  mode of comparative  analysis
because:  (a)  there  is general  consensus  that procedural democracy  is essential  and basic
to  the meaning of democracy, whereas  constitutions in robust democracies  each enshrine
different substantive  values; and  (b) it  is closer to the analysis of the interpretive  process
that  has been  applied  in  the  context of American  law:  for example,  where  substantive
constitutional values  typically adopt procedural  form.  See,  e.g.,  Owen  Fiss,  Objectivity and
Interpretation,  34 STAN.  L. REV.  739,  751-55  (1982)  (arguing that law borrows from  moral-
ity when  it  comes  to substantive  notions  like  "liberty"  and "equality,"  that the extent of
borrowing  differs  depending  on the legal  tradition, and  that even  positivism-which  at-
tempts to separate  law from morals-cannot  do so absolutely  because judges  must try to
give  meaning to  public moral  values enshrined  in  the  Constitution).  For common  gen-
eral  critiques  of substantive  democracy,  see  generally  ROBERT  DAHL,  ON  DEMOCRACY
(1998)  (challenging representative  democracy); JOHN  STUART  MILL,  ON  LIBERTY  (David
Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale  University Press  2003)  (1859)  (taking issue with the
strictures that substantive rights place on democratic procedure).
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esses.  In part, this tension is  a regular feature even of "old" constitu-
tions  that  both  recognize  a  role  for religion  and prohibit  religious
discrimination  through a liberal democratic promise of equality.  For
example, European Union Member nations Finland, Greece, and the
United Kingdom  each  establish some form of Christianity  as the offi-
cial state religion.  At the same time, the constitutions or laws of each
country  also  contain  provisions  for  the  equality  and  rights  of their
citizens,  regardless  of religious  affiliation.  In  these  countries,  the
state  must ensure  that the  established  religion  does  not impinge  on
the freedoms of any of its citizens and that religion will never impede
fair  democratic  processes.  The  United  States  handles  the  religion-
state  problem uniquely with its  twin Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. s°  It,  too,  must ensure  that  its  commitment  to  church-state
separation  does not impinge on the freedoms of its citizens.  In sum,
these  countries all seek to balance religion with democratic norms."'
79  See 2000 Suomen  Perustuslaki  [Constitution]  § 76  (Fin.)  (incorporating the Church Act,
which regulates  the Evangelical  Lutheran  Church of Finland  and the Finnish Orthodox
Church,  according  each  legal  protection  and  powers  to  levy  taxes  on  their  respective
communities);  id. at § 6  (equality  clause);  see  also 2001  Syntamga  [Constitution]  art.  3,
par.  1 (Greece)  (specifying  that the  Greek-Orthodox  dogma  is  the prevailing  religion,
that the Church  of Greece  is inseparably united in  doctrine  with the Ecumenical  Patriar-
chate of Constantinople  and with all  other Orthodox  Churches, and  that the Church  is
self-administered).  The United  Kingdom has no formal written constitution.  A combina-
tion  of acts establish  the Church  as  the  state  religion  and require  freedom  of religion.
E.g.,  Human  Rights  Act,  1998,  c.  42,  §  13  (Eng.),  available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts1998/19980042.htm  (protecting the  right to  freedom of religion); Act of Settle-
ment,  1700,  6  Will.  3,  c.  2,  §§ II-Ill  (Eng.),  available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/
content.aspx?activeTextDocld=1565208  (requiring  that anyone  who will  become  a  King
or Queen of England to be a member of the Church of England).
80  U.S. CONST.  amend. I  ("Congress shall make no law respecting an  establishment of relig-
ion,  or prohibiting  the free  exercise  thereof .. ");  see also U.S.  CONST.  amend. XIV, §  1
("No  State shall..,  deny  to any person within  its jurisdiction  the equal  protection of the
laws.").  Similar to  European  states,  a host  of statutes  further define the contours of the
Establishment/Free  Exercise  Clauses, and  the Supreme Court clarifies  the constitutional
and statutory standards.  For the seminal  case detailing requirements  for legislation  con-
cerning  religion,  see  Lemon  v.  Kurtzman, 403  U.S.  602,  612-13  (1971)  (declaring  that
while  laws  must have  a "secular ...  purpose,"  only  "excessive ...  entanglement"  renders
them impermissible  (emphasis added)).
81  Contrast  this  with  France  (an  old  constitution)  and  Turkey  (a  newer  constitution-
ratified  in  1982),  in which  secularism  can  curtail religious  freedoms.  See 1958  CONST.  1
(Fr.)  (declaring France to be a secular nation); Loi du 9 d~cembre  1905 relative  i  s~para-
tion  des Eglises et  de l'ltat, as amended July 29,  2005, tit.  1, art.  2, Journal  Officiel de  la
R4publique  Franqaise  U.O.]  [Official  Gazette  of  France],  available at  http://-v.
assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/egliseetat/sommaire.asp,  translation available at http://
www.concordatwatch.eu/showkb.php?org-id=867&kb  header id=849&kbid=1525&orde
r=kbrank%20ASC  ("La  R~publique  ne  reconnait,  ne salarie  ni ne subventionne  aucun
culte."  ["The  Republic  does not recognize,  salary, or subsidize  any religion."]);  see also
No.  288 Loi  encadrant,  en  application  du  principe  de  laicit6,  le  port de  signes  ou  de
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Iraq  faces  a  similar  challenge.  Its  Constitution  creates  a  system
that establishes  Islam as the state religion.  The added complication  is
that Iraq not only establishes  a state religion, but it also incorporates
a legal system  of religious origin as a source  of state law.  The extent
and implications  of this added challenge-particularly  vis-A-vis  the ju-
rists,  given  their  historical  role  in  interpreting  Islamic  law-are  the
subject of this Article.
To be  sure,  like Iraq,  some Western  nations incorporate  religion
in legislation and adjudication. 2  But unlike  Iraq, such practices  typi-
cally  are  doctrinally  impermissible  under their  laws.  Most  constitu-
tional systems  direct legislators  to draw upon secular sources for law-
making,  and when  constitutional  courts review the propriety of such
laws, they are  to do so with respect to a secular legal regime.  By con-
trast,  Iraq's  Constitution  permits,  indeed  directs,  legislators  and
judges to draw upon Islamic law.  Given  the dual role for Islamic and
democratic  principles-as  sources of law-making  and adjudication-
how  can  Iraq  negotiate  its version  of tensions  between  religion  and
the state?
tenues  manifestant  une  appartenance  religieuse  dans &oles,  collbges  et lyces publics,
Assemblhe  Nationale,  Douzibme  Legislature  (2004),  available  at  http://www.
assembleenat.fr/12/pdf/ta/ta-0253.pdf  (forbidding the display  of conspicuous  religious
symbols  in the French public); Justin Vaisse,  Veiled Meaning:  The French Law Banning  Reli-
gious Symbols in Public Schools  (Brookings Institute,  2004)  (noting that the  law  is also re-
ferred  to as the "headscarf ban," because of the Muslim  religious symbols that it implicitly
targeted, given  previous  calls  and defeated proposals  for a ban  on headscarves).  France
organizes  religion through official  religious councils, one of which is the  French Council
for the Muslim Religion  formed in 2002 and 2003.  SeeJonathan  Laurence, From the I lysie
Salon to the Table of the Republic:  State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France,
23 FRENCH  POL.,  CULTURE & SOC'Y 37,  55  (2005)  (describing  the creation  of the French
Council of the Muslim Religion).
Compare  Turkey's similar form  of religion-state separation  that followed  from Kemal
Ataturk's  1924  westernization  movement  and  resulted  in  subordination  of religion  to
state,  following  the  French  model  of laicit6.  See  1982  Tfirkiye  Cumhuriyeti  Anayasasi
[Constitution]  art.  10  (Turk.)  (equality  clause);  id. art. 14  (human rights  clause);  id. art.
24 (freedom of religion); id. art. 2  (affirming the secular nature of the Turkish Republic).
Until February  2008, Turkey had a similar ban on headscarves  in public institutions; this
ban was  upheld by the European  Court on Human  Rights,  see Sahin v. Turkey, App.  No.
44774/98  (Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  June  29,  2004),  available  at  http://www.associazione
deicostituzionalisti.it/cronache/giurisprudenza-comunitaria/cedu-velo/Sentenza-cedu
_velo.pdf, but was  recently  overturned  by the  new Turkish  Parliament,  see  Turkey and Is-
lam:  Veils of Half-Truth,  ECONOMIST,  Feb.  16, 2008, at 30.
82  SeeJames  Q. Whitman,  Church  and State:  Why Are  America and Europe  So Different?,
3-7,  http://wvw.law.berkeley.edu/centers/kadish/Whitman%20Church%20and%20
State%20for%20Boalt%20091406.pdf  (demonstrating the important role  religion plays in
American politics).
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One  proposal  has  been  advanced  by Abdolkarim  Soroush,  who
has  been  described  as  the  foremost  thinker  on  Islam  and  democ-
racy.
3  He suggests a conceptual  framework for envisioning  a robust
democracy that is "religious. 8 4  For him, those who argue that Islam  is
incompatible  with  democracy  do  so  only  because  they  erroneously
conceive  of Islamic  constitutional  governments  as  ones that concen-
trate  power  in  the  hands  of jurists  and discriminate  on  the  basis  of
gender and  religion  according  to  a monolithic  view  of the  harshest
legal rules articulated byjurists.  This obscures the processes of inter-
pretation and deliberation  that can  and should take place in a consti-
tutional democracy where "we  the people" champion religious values
in particular.  In fact, in his conception, a state would be described as
religious  only according  to  the popular will  of the majority;  and  the
voices  of that  religious  majority  would  express  themselves  through
democratic  processes  against  the  backdrop  of constitutional  protec-
tions for human rights and freedoms for minorities in particular.s
Soroush  contends  that any potential  conflicts  that Islamic  mores
visit upon  democratic  processes  emerge  with  apparent  tensions  be-
tween  reason  and  revelation,  but  that such  conflicts  are  overcome
once  revelation  is  understood in  context.  As  embodied  in  religion,
he  argues,  revelation  is  nothing  more  than  evolving religious  under-
standing that has  been articulated  and updated  (or not) through hu-
816 man interpretive processes.  Thus understood, religion constitutes  a
rational  discipline  analogous  to other scientific  disciplines.  Like  sci-
ence,  which  best  approximates  a  description  of the  corporal  world
according  to ongoing  developments  in  an ever-changing field,  relig-
ion reflects  developing understandings of a moral universe.  Building
upon  past  knowledge  and  new  developments,  the  conclusions  or
theories of both science  and religion  expand and contract over time,
achieving  approximations  that  are  at  times  closer  to,  and  at  other
times far  away from,  the  mark.8
'  Like  scientific  reasoning, religious
83  See  FOROUGH  JAHANBAKHSH,  ISLAM,  DEMOCRACY  AND  RELIGIOUS  MODERNISM  IN  IRAN
(1953-2000):  FROM  BAZARGAN  TO SOROUSH  143  (2001)  (describing Soroush's academic
grounding in science, Islamic thought, and politics).
84  See SOROUSH,  supra note  17, at  133-34.  There  is  some  indication  that  Soroush  recently
has revised  his views.  See infra note 87.
85  Id. at 145.
86  Id. at 134, 144.
87  This is the argument advanced in  Soroush's most famous  (and most controversial)  book:
QABZ  VA BASAT-I  TEORIK-I  SHARI'AT:  NAZARIYEH-Yi  TA  AMOL-I  MA'REFAT-I  DINT  [EXPANSION
AND  CONTRACTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT:  A  COMPREHENSIVE  THEORY OF  RELIGIOUS
KNOWLEDGE]  (7th  ed.  2002).  But  see  ABDOLKARIM  SOROUSH,  REINVENTING  THE
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reasoning  (interpretation)  is  not bound  to pre-existing  assumptions,
and  in  that sense,  he  says,  it is  secular.  For  Soroush,  a  coherent
form  of  practical  reasoning  should  guide  interpretation  in  both
spheres,  and its  development  should  be  facilitated  by  an open  and
democratic exchange  of ideas.  In the sphere of religious  democracy
in particular,  Soroush  makes  the Rawlsian  argument that the role  of
reason  is "collective ...  arising from  the kind of public  participation
and  human  experience  that are  available  only  through  democratic
methods." 9
For Soroush, advocating the primacy of reason over religion in the
sphere  of  governance  is  different  from  advocating  Western  "ex-
treme liberalism,"9 0  which  should  not  be  equated  to  democracy  it-
self.9'  Soroush  subscribes to a  proceduralist view of democracy.  For
him,  democracy requires  elections  (popular  sovereignty  and  political
process)  and a  separation  of powers  (institutional  structure) . And
liberal democracy limits the decisions of the populace  and their insti-
tutions with certain Western Enlightenment and Revolutionary ideals,
such  as particular  forms  of equality, freedom,  and  other substantive
rights.
93  These  liberal values  enrich  the  system  and promote justice
even  as  they  limit  absolute  expressions  of popular  will  and  aim  to
prevent undesirable  outcomes-like Nazism, fascism, or invidious dis-
crimination.  That these  values  place  strictures  on  the  popular  will
may  render  them  undemocratic  according  to  proceduralist  views
such  as Mill's; yet these same liberal values  reflect ideals that the peo-
ple once selected or to which they at least acquiesce.94
Soroush  argues  that  religious democracy-where  the  substantive
values extend from religion-is similar.  For example, in Islamic intel-
lectual  and  legal  history,  considerations  of the  public  interest  and
God's justice extend from rational  theological and philosophical dis-
cussions.95  In general,  the  argument  goes,  values  are not legal,  but
ethical;  they are rational  expressions  of the  evolving  moral sense  of
society at large,  extra-legal sentiments  of the  populace  that give  rise
MU'TAZILITE  EXPERIMENT  (forthcoming)  (possibly  distancing  himself from  these earlier
views).
88  SOROUSH,  supra note 17, at 67.
89  Id. at 127.
90  Id. at 134.
91  Id. at 68, 134,  144.
92  Id. at 134.
93  Id.
94  Id. at 151.
95  Id. at 128-29.
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to particular laws.96  Democracy that recognizes religion or Islamic  law
merely  introduces  other  substantive  values  and  supports  a  compli-
mentary relationship  between governance  and religion:  citizens  may
dissent by calling upon shared religious mores  to play a role  in  con-
structively critiquing state action on moral grounds and may thereby
augment values  ofjustice, freedom, and liberty.97
In his  reflections  about  democratic  theory in  a religious  context,
Soroush draws  upon his critique of the Iranian experiment, which he
views as a failed attempt at democratic Islamic constitutionalism.  But
he does not conclude  that such attempts always  must fail.  Rather, he
insists that governments  can be both  religious  and  democratic,  pro-
vided they take a dynamic  view of legal interpretation 9  and negotiate
the proper relationship  with the juristic branch  in doing so.  The im-
plication  is that in Iraq,  if the people  followed  democratic  processes
of constitutional ratification  and elections to select a form of religious
and  liberal  democracy  that incorporates  Islamic  law,99  this  arrange-
ment  must  be  respected.  It  is  up  to  the  government,  under  this
scheme,  to contemplate  the substance of the Constitution's  multiple
96  Id.
97  Id. at  142,  152-53 ("Religions,  as bulwarks of morality, can  serve as the best guarantors  of
democracy.");  cf generally STEPHEN  L.  CARTER,  CULTURE  OF DISBELIEF (1993);  STEPHEN L.
CARTER,  DISSENT  OF  THE  GOVERNED:  A  MEDITATION  ON  LAW,  RELIGION,  AND  LOYALTY
(1998).  Of course  the sticking point between  constitutional and  Islamic law scholars  on
the one hand and Islamists who promote a form of traditional Islamic  law on the other is
whether pre-modern  values  override rather than  augment modern  conceptions ofjustice,
freedom, and liberty.
98  Without using  the  phrase, Soroush uses  the idea of "dynamic  interpretation"  developed
by  American  legal  scholars.  See,  e.g.,  RICHARD  FALLON,  THE  DYNAMIC  CONSTITUTION
(2004);  WILLIAM  N.  ESKRIDGE,  JR.,  DYNAMIC  STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION  (1994).  The
idea  of dynamism  is  countered  by formalism or new textualism  in the American  context,
and by salafi readings in  the Islamic legal context, in which foundational or constitutional
texts are seen  to be static documents that should be interpreted according  to original  in-
tent.  See,  e.g., ANTONIN  SCALIA,  A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION  (1997)  (laying out the new
textualist approach);John  Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101  COLUM.  L.
REv.  1 120-28  (2001)  (arguing that the Constitution constrains the authority to interpret
and  noting  that the  proper  role  of the judiciary  is  not  to  be  an  interstitial  law-maker
through broad interpretation  but a "faithful agent"  to the  legislature).  Justice  Scalia has
been  quoted as  saying, "The Constitution  is not a living organism, it is  a legal document.
It says something and doesn't say other things....  [Y]ou  would have to be an  idiot to be-
lieve  that [the  Constitution]  ...  has  to  change  with  society,  like a  living organism  .... "
Jonathan  Ewing,  Scalia Has Harsh  Words for Those  Who  Believe  in  'Living Constitution,'
LAW.COM,  Feb.  15,  2006,  http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1139911515240.  The
salafi  originalist  debate  with  Islamic  legal  "dynamists"  is  less  well  (or colorfully)  docu-
mented in  the secondary literature, but the parallels are close.
99  For a discussion of the extent to which Iraq's constitutional drafting and ratification was a
result of legitimate democratic processes, see supra  notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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components  and to  determine  exactly where  Islamic  law falls  within
that scheme.
A second proposal takes up where  the latter left off.  Islamic legal
scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that democracy is the best system
for Islamic governance...  and arguably  may be  taken  to suggest that
jurists  can  or should  play a  consultative  role  in  defining  the nature
and content of Islamic  law for a democratic Islamic constitutional  re-
gime:
I would suggest Shari'ah  ought to stand in an Islamic polity as a symbolic
construct  for  the  divine  perfection  that  is unreachable  by  human  ef-
fort ....  Jurists ought to continue  to explore the  ideal of Shari'ah  and to
expound  their imperfect attempts at understanding God's perfection.  As
long as  the argument constructed  is normative  it is  unfulfilled  potential
to reach the Divine Will.  Significantly, any law applied  is necessarily a po-
tential-unrealized.  Shari'ah  is  not simply a collection  of ahkam (a set of
positive  rules)  but also a set of principles,  a methodology, and a discour-
sive  process  that searches  for  the  divine  ideals.  As  such,  Shari'ah  is  a
work in progress that is never complete.
To put it more concretely:  if a legal opinion is adopted and enforced
by the state, it cannot be said to be God's law.
101
By acknowledging  the limited yet present role of Islamic  law, Abou El
Fadl  is doing three  things:  (1)  acknowledging  the jurists as  the his-
torical interpreters  of Islamic  law,  thereby  (2)  suggesting  some  state
recognition  for their deliberations,  but  (3)  insisting  that such  delib-
erations must not receive more authoritative weight than due.
This view follows historical trends in Islamic political theory, albeit
in the  new  guise of discussions  concerning Islamic  constitutionalism
and democracy.  Jurists  historically have  long enjoyed interpretive  le-
gal authority and have been viewed as the repositories of institutional
competence  necessary  to  interpret and  articulate  Islamic  law.  This
was a result of twin theoretical  and historical  circumstances:  the idea
100  Abou El  Fadl,  supra note 38, at  10  ("In  my view,  there are  several reasons  that commend
democracy,  and  especially  a  constitutional  democracy,  as  the  system  most capable  of
promoting  the  ethical  and  moral  imperatives  of Islam....  [I]n  essence,  I would argue
that a democracy offers the greatest potentialfor  promotingjustice,  and protecting human
dignity, without making God responsible for human injustice or the infliction of degrada-
tion by human beings upon one another....  A constitutional democracy avoids the prob-
lem  [of 'having  a  small group of people appointing  themselves  as the  voice of God, and
speaking  in  God's name']  by  enshrining some basic  moral standards  in  a constitutional
document, and  thus, guarantees  some discernment  and differentiation, but, at the same
time,  a democracy insures  that no single person  or group becomes  the infallible  repre-
sentative of divinity.").
101  Abou El  Fadl, supra note 63  (arguing that human effort can determine a course of action
that is  potentially synonymous with  God's law, but human action is  always necessarily im-
perfect).
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that the community leader was  to uphold  Islamic  law'°2 and  that the
jurists were  to  be  independent  from  the  state.
03   Thus, jurists  con-
cerned  with  the  ruler's obligations  to  Islamic  law  (and  thus  to God
and the community) attempted  to delineate,  and perhaps  restrict, ar-
eas  of his discretionary  authority  over matters  of administration  and
law.
1 0 4  The  inverse of the ruler's  legal jurisdiction  was  theirs.  In  or-
der for  him  to  follow and  apply  the  law, jurists  reasoned,  he would
have  to consult  with them  or yield  authority  over purely legal deter-
minations  to  them.  To support their arguments, typically jurists  cum
political  theorists contemplated  an informal arrangement,  calling up
historical  precedents  where  Muslim  rulers  consulted  the  jurists-
from  the  Prophet  through  the  'Abb~sid  caliphs.1
0
5  Some  even  en-
102  Indeed,  the first idea was the raison d'tre of the state  and the basis  for a ruler's  claim to
legitimate authority over a Muslim  polity.  See, e.g., MUHAMMAD  B.  AL-TAYYIB AL-BAQILLANI,
AL-TAMHiD  F!  AL-RADD  'ALA  AL-MULHIDA  AL-MU'ATt'ALA  WA-AL-RAFIDA  WA-AL-KHAWARIJ  WA-
AL-MU'TAZILA  56  (Dar  al-Fikr  al-'Arabi  1989);  ABO  AL-HASAN  'ALl  B.  MUHAMMAD  AL-
MAWARDI,  AL-AHKAM  AL-SULTANIYYA  [THE  LAWS  OF  ISLAMIC  GOVERNANCE]  ch.  1
(Muhammad  FahmT  al-Sarani  ed.,  Wafaa  Wahba  trans.  [THE  ORDINANCES  OF
GOVERNMENT],  1996)  (1978);  IBN  AL-JAWZT,  1  AL-MISBAH  AL-MUDi'  FI  AL-KHILAFAT  AL-
MUSTAI'  93  (Ibrahim  Najiyya  ed.,  Matba'at  al-Awqaf  1979);  see  also YUSUF  IBISH,  THE
POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  OF  AL-BAQILLANI  (1966).  For  Sh'i  views,  see  AL-SHARIF  AL-
MURTADA,  AL-SHAFi  Fl  AL-IMAMA;  see  also A.  K. S.  LAMBTON,  STATE  AND  GOVERNMENT  IN
MEDIEVAL  ISLAM  219-69  (1981),  and  'Wilfred Madelung,  Imama,  in  3  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF
ISLAM  2d ed.  1163-69 (1954-2005).
103  See,  e.g.,  Abou  El  Fadl, supra note  38,  at 30-31  ("[B]y  the ...  10th century,  Muslim jurists
had  established  themselves  as  the  legitimate  and  exclusive  authority  empowered  to ex-
pound  the  law  of God.  Only the jurists  were  deemed  to  possess  the  requisite  level  of
technical  competence  and learning that would qualify them  to investigate  and interpret
the Divine will....  However, pursuant to the powers derived  from its role as  the enforcer
of Divine  laws,  the State  was granted a broad range  of discretion  over what were consid-
ered  matters of public interest  [known as the field of al-siyasah al-Shar'iyyah]. The  State's
rule-making activity  in the exercise  of this discretion was considered  to  be akin  to regula-
tory  administrative  rules  that  have  temporal weight,  but that  are  not a  part  of binding
precedents of Shari'ah law."  (second  alteration in original)).
104  This pushed M~wardi  to write  what is  regarded  as the first treatise  exclusively devoted to
the subject, written at a  time when caliphal authority was waning and de facto  rulers  (sul-
tans) threatened to assert increasing authority over  matters of law.  See generally MAWARDi,
supra note  102  (explaining the  contours, jurisdiction,  and interactions of administrative
law, or even administrative  prerogative,  to determine  the law with  respect to Islamic  law);
see  also JACKSON,  supra note  23; Sherman Jackson,  From Prophetic Action  to  Constitutional
Theory:  A  Novel Chapter in  Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence,  25  INT'LJ.  MIDDLE  E.  STUD.  71,
71-90  (1993).
105  See,  e.g.,  IBN  AL-JAWZI,  supra note  102,  216-20  (Ndjiyya  'Abd  al-Allah  IbrfhTm  ed.,  n.d.)
(noting that the first  caliph,  Abu  Bakr,  is said  to  have  instructed  the scholars  to  advise
him,  telling them  to correct him if he strayed, that Umayyad Caliph  Sulayman b. 'Abd  al-
Malik,  used  to consult with  [Meccan jurist]  'Ata'  b. Abi Rab  h, and that likewise  'Abbasid
Caliph  Harin al-RashTd  would ask  [Medinan jurist and  Mlik-school  eponym]  Malik  b.
Anas and others for their input, as did 'Abbasid  Caliphs Amin  and Ma'min);  see also Abou
El  Fadl, supra note  63,  at 7  ("The  Qur'an instructs  the Prophet to consult regularly with
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couraged  a  formal  relationship.  For  example,  Ibn  al-Jawzi  argued
that a ruler should ensure the presence  of the "major scholars" at his
decision-making sessions.l6
Such  historical  precedent  offers  both  opportunities  and  chal-
lenges to the idea of a functioning democracy under Islamic constitu-
tionalism.  On the one hand, pre-modern jurists'  theories concerning
Islamic law and the state  could be seen as imposing a requirement of
limiting government  by the rule of law.  These theories could provide
an opportunity for a historically grounded ideal  of limited powers  in
the  government  and amongst  the jurists  in an Islamic  constitutional
state.  And  they could  be seen to restrict the scope  of juristic compe-
tence  to matters  that involve  religio-legal  issues rather  than political-
administrative  or  factual  determinations. 7  Accordingly,  they  also
may suggest  more ready acceptance  amongst the populace  ("We  the
People")  of Muslim-majority  states  and  thus  legitimacy  for  the  gov-
ernment.  All of these conceptions  could serve  to bolster and temper
the modern proposals concerning Islamic constitutionalism.
But  on  the  other  hand,  pre-modern juristic  theories  pose  chal-
lenges to a democratic  constitutional ideal because of the possibilities
for abuse.  For example, these same theories of law-limited  rule have
been  viewed  (among early and  modern jurists)  as a requirement to
implement particular  rules of Islamic  law.' 08  Abou  El Fadl has  noted
that this is  problematic because  Islamic law is seen as a static body of
rules divorced from the complexities and dynamism of legal interpre-
tation:
[W]e  must distinguish between  the idea of the supremacy of law, and the
supremacy  of legal rules....  [A]  government could  implement  Shari'ah
criminal  penalties,  prohibit  usury,  dictate  rules  of modesty,  and  so  on,
Muslims  on  all significant  matters  and  indicates  that  a society  that conducts  its  affairs
through  some form  of deliberative  process is  considered praiseworthy in  the eyes of God
(3:159;  42:38).  There are  many historical  reports  suggesting that the Prophet consulted
regularly with his Companions regarding  the affairs of the state.  In addition, shortly after
the death of the Prophet, the concept of shura (consultative deliberations)  had become  a
symbol signifying participatory politics and legitimacy.").
106  E.g.,  IBN  AL-JAWZI,  supra  note  102, at 216.
107  See Iraq Hearing,  supra  note 76, at 16.
108  For example, the obligation  for rulers to uphold Islamic  law for the purpose of preserving
law and order in  the public sphere has been  expressed  in terms of imposing  fixed crimi-
nal penalties.  E.g., MAWARDI,  supra note  102, at  312; ABU  ISHAQ IBN  FARHON,  2 TABsiRAT
AL-HUKKAM  F!  USOL  AL-AQDIYA  WA  MANAHIJ  AL-A.KAM  115-16  (Beirut  1995);  QARAFI,  3
TAHDHIB  AL-FUROQ WA AL-QAWA'ID  AL-SUNNIYYA  FI AL-ASRAR  AL-FIQHIYA  845 (Cairo,  1926-
1928).  In the  modern day, it has been  expressed  in similar  terms in Northern  Nigeria,
for instance, where  a return  to  Islamic  law has meant in part a  return  to  imposing fixed
criminal penalties.
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and yet remain a government of unlimited powers  not subject to the rule
of law.  This is because  Shari'ah is a general term for a multitude of legal
methodologies  and  a  remarkably  diverse  set  of interpretive  determina-
tions.
1"
In more  specific  terms,  these  theories  could  be  taken  to  ignore  the
role of human agency and the deliberative-consultative  process in in-
terpreting  the law.  These  ideas,  too, were  amply  represented  in  Is-
lamic  tradition.  One  anecdote, for instance,  tells of a  time  of strife
between  'AlR  (the fourth caliph)  and his one-time  followers, who  dis-
puted  his  decision to  submit to  arbitration  to  resolve  Umayyad  con-
tender Mu'dwiya's  challenge to his caliphate:
'Ali touched  the Qur'an while  instructing  it to inform  the people  about
God's law.  Surprised,  the people gathered around  'Ali exclaimed, "What
are you doing?!  The Qur'an cannot speak, for it is not a human being."
Upon  hearing this,  'Ali  exclaimed  that this  is exactly  the point he  is try-
ing  to  make.  The  Qur'an,  'Ali  explained,  is  but ink and paper,  and it
does  not speak for itself.  Instead, it is human beings who give effect to it
according to their limited personal judgments and opinions.1
According to Abou El Fadl, realizing this can avoid the "dogmatic su-
perficiality  of proclamations  of God's  dominion or sovereignty  in or-
der  to  legitimate  and  empower  what  are  fundamentally  human  de-
terminations.""'
Considered  together, these  conceptual  proposals for a functional
Islamic  constitutional  government yield a few indispensable  observa-
tions.  The scholars advancing these views argue that a successful gov-
ernment  in  that context acknowledges  the indeterminacy  of the  law
and  the  difference  between  political  and  religious jurisdictions,  ad-
mits  the  human  agency  of jurists and  legislators  in  interpreting  the
law, and recognizes  the historical and institutional competence  of the
jurists while avoiding establishing or permitting their structural or in-
stitutional dominance  over the legislative or legal interpretive sphere.
These  offer useful  points  to  bear in mind when  considering new  Is-
lamic constitutional  states  like Iraq, stopping just short of suggesting
practical  forms  that such collaboration  and reconsideration  between
the  government and  the jurists might take.  Those  issues cannot be
109  Abou El Fadl, supra note 38, at 28.
110  Id. at  15-16  (citing  14 AHMAD  B.  'ALI  B. IHAJAR  AL-'ASQALANi,  FATH  AL-BARI  BI-SHARI!  AL-
BUKHARI  303  (Dar  al-Fikr  1993);  7  MUHAMMAD  B.  'ALI  AL-SHAWKANI,  NAYL  AL-AWTAR:
SHARHI MUN'TAQA  AL-AKHBAR  MIN AHADITH  SAYYID AL-AKHYAR  166 (Dar al-Hadith  1993)).
111  Id. at 16.
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predicted, for they depend on further elaboration of the Iraqi Consti-
tution by Iraqi law-makers and adjudicators.  But existing models that
have  charted  various paths  in  that regard  may  be helpful  in concep-
tualizing possible arrangements.
B.  Comparative  Models
One  way  of examining  questions  of  the  governmental  arrange-
ment  that Islamic  constitutionalism  might assume  is to  examine  the
forms that it has  assumed in other countries in the region.  Regional
Islamic constitutional  countries  present three models  of institutional
relations between  the government and the jurists, with  respect to Is-
lamic  legal interpretation.  At one extreme  is dominant constitution-
alization,  in which the constitution  empowers the jurists to specify the
content of Islamic law and  its interpretation  directly, and gives  their
views  priority over  political  or judicial  processes.  Here,  the govern-
ment derives  its very authority from  religious  texts, and  so vests  ulti-
mate  interpretation  in  the  hands  of religiously  oriented jurists.  At
the  other  extreme  is  delegated  constitutionalization,  in  which  the
constitution  specifies  that  Islamic  law will  remain uncodified,  to  be
determined  by jurists  in  shaff'a courts.  Ostensibly,  the  government
maintains  control over  these courts.  But when  it staffs  them with ju-
rists  to whom it delegates authority not only to evaluate  Islamic legal
matters, but also to legislate  them, it too vests ultimate interpretation
in  the  hands  of the jurists.  For both of these  extremes,  the Fourth
Branch  remains  unchecked  except within  the  confines  of the  com-
munity ofjurists itself.  In the middle is a type of constitutionalization
that may be  called coordinate.  Here, the government  seeks to main-
tain a  system of checks-and-balances  and separation-of-powers  famil-
iar  to many modern democracies.  The  head  of state is  to be  popu-
larly  elected  and  control  executive  affairs,  a  popularly  elected
parliament  is  to  exercise  legislative  authority,  and  state-appointed
judges are  to wield  exclusive adjudicative  authority.  In  practice,  the
Islamic  law incorporation  implies  a merely  consultative  role  for  the
jurists  in the state  institutions'  law-making  processes.  As outlined  be-
low, the extent of, and mechanisms  for, juristic  involvement in  each
model vary.
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1.  Dominant Constitutionalization
The  paradigmatic  example  of dominant  constitutionalization  of
Islamic law is Iran."2  Iran's Constitution designates  ShVism as the of-
ficial religion,"
3  makes  Islamic  criteria  the  basis  for all  legislation,"
4
and includes  an Islamic  law non-contradiction  clause."5  Thus, struc-
turally, the  Constitution  ensures  that jurists will  dominate  each  gov-
ernmental branch.
As  for the legislature,  a body  called the  Guardian Council  makes
determinations  of  each  law's  compliance  with  Islamic  legal  rules
through  an  automatic  right to  review  all  legislation." 6  Members  of
this body  may  also  guide  legislation  by  attending parliamentary  ses-
sions  and  commenting  on  draft  laws  as  they  are  debated."7  The
Council  comprises  six jurists and  six  legal  experts,  all  of whom  are
elected  by Parliament from  amongst  the  Muslim jurists  screened  by
the Supreme Judicial  Council and nominated  by the Head of the Ju-
dicial  Power.""  Members  of the Supreme Judicial  Council  are  classi-
112  Islamic elements appear in  125 articles of the Iranian Constitution.  See ASGHAR SCHIRAZI,
THE  CONSTITUTION OF IRAN:  POLITICS AND THE STATE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 8  (1997).
113  1980  Qaniin-i AsWsi-yi Jumhfari-yi  Islam!-yi Tran  [Basic  Law of the Islamic Republic  of Iran
(as amended)]  arts. 12-14.  The constitution permits minority (Sunni)  Islamic schools to
act in accord with their  own laws  for religious  rites,  personal status, and related litigation
in the courts, id. art.  12, accords similar confessional deference  to designated non-Muslim
religious  minorities, id. art. 13,  and "tolerates" non-Muslims,  id. art. 14.
114  Id. art. 4  ("All  civil, penal, financial,  economic, administrative,  cultural, military, political,
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria  [mavazTn-i Islim].").
115  Id. art.  72  ("The  Islamic  Consultative Assembly  [Parliament]  cannot enact  laws  contrary
to the official religion  of the country or to  the Constitution.  It is  the duty of the Guard-
ian  Council to determine  whether  a violation  has  occurred, in  accordance  with  Article
96.-).
116  Id. art. 96  ("The  majority of jurists  (3)  of the Guardian  Council  shall  decide whether  or
not the legislation  passed by the Parliament  is  in conformity with Islam's  [legal]  rulings
(ahm-i  Isldm) ...  .");  id. art. 98  ("The interpretation  of the Constitution shall  be the re-
sponsibility of the Guardian Council  ...  .");  id. art. 94 ("All  enactments of the Parliament
shall  be submitted  to  the Guardian  Council and the Council  shall examine  them  within
ten days  after the receipt  thereof to see whether  or not they reconcile with the tenets  of
Islam and constitutional  law.  If the Guardian Council  finds the enactments  contrary to Is-
lamic  tenets  and  constitutional  law, it shall  return  them  to  Parliament for  reconsidera-
tion."); cf. MALLAT, supra note 41, at 80-81  (noting the incomparably expansive powers of
this state council when compared to the review functions of State Councils  in France  and
Germany).
117  1980  Qdniln-i Asasi-yi Jumhiiri-yi  Isldmi-yi Iran  [Basic  Law of the  Islamic Republic  of Iran
(as  amended)]  arts.  95-98  (detailing  the  Guardian  Council's  powers  of review,  atten-
dance,  and approval);  cf MALLAT,  supra  note 41,  at 82 (describing the likely composition
of the Council).
118  1980  Qdnfin-i As~i-yi Jumhri-yi  Islami-yi Tran  [Basic  Law of the Islamic Republic  of Iran
(as amended)]  art. 91  (defining jurists asfuqahl',  legal experts as huqzqddn).
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cally trained jurists,"'  and its Head is selected  by the Supreme Leader,
who  is himself a classically trained jurist.1
2 0  Thus the Guardian Coun-
cil, despite  its formal attachment to the legislature, is dominated by a
judiciary made up of classically  trained jurists who ensure  the promi-
nence of like-minded jurists on the Council.1
2  All this results in what
has been termed an inevitable  "institutionalized juristic quality of the
Council of the Guardians."'2 2
Iraq's  Islamic  law  constitutionalization  is  very  different  from
Iran's.  Structurally, Iraq neither incorporates the jurists into the gov-
ernmental  structure directly,  nor does  it specify  the criteria for their
training or orientation, as Iran does through the Guardianship  of the
Jurists  doctrine.  By  equating  Islamic  norms  with  democratic  and
human  rights  norms,  the  Iraqi  Constitution  implicitly  requires  that
any role  the  government subsequently  specifies for jurists in  the  de-
terminations  over Islamic  law should be  coordinate,  as described  be-
low.  Kristen  Stilt has pointed out that the  Iranian  model is  an inap-
posite  comparison  for  other  reasons  as  well:  leading  ShT'i  clerics
reject the  Khomeini  formulation  of the  Guardianship  of the Jurists
doctrine,  many  ShT'is  in  the lay  population  are  critical  of Iran with
the  experience  of hindsight, and  the Iraqi  population  is  more relig-
iously  diverse  than  that  of Iran-with  a  mix  of  ShVTs,  Sunnis  and
other substantial minorities.  11
2.  Delegated Constitutionalization
Examples  of delegated  constitutionalization  include  many of the
Gulf countries:  Bahrain  (ShT'T majority, Shdfi'i and Maliki minority),
the  United  Arab  Emirates  (Sunni  majority,  ShVi  minority),  Qatar
(Hanbali  majority),  Oman  (Ibadi  majority),  and  Saudi  Arabia
(Hanbali  majority).'  These  countries  have  no codified  family  law,
119  Id. art. 162  (mandating that the Chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General
be "just honorable men well versed  in judicial  matters"); cf  MALLAT, supra note 41,  at 82
(arguing that the Council  will be dominated by classically trained jurists).
120  1980 Qinon-i Asi-yi JumhirT-yi  IslamT-yi  Irn [Basic  Law  of the Islamic Republic  of Iran
(as amended)]  arts.  109-110  (setting out the qualifications  and  duties  of the  Supreme
Leader).
121  MALLAT,  supra note  41,  at  82  (describing the  comprehensive  authority of the  Supreme
Judicial Council over selection of Guardian Council members).
122  Id. at 82.
123  See Stilt, supra note 22, at 719.  For further background  on Sh'i differences  regarding the
Guardianship  of the Jurists doctrine during its formative stages in  Iraq, see  MALLAT, supra
note 41, at 59-78; SCHIRAZI,  supra note 112, at 45-58.
124  Countries  that do not incorporate  Islamic law through the constitution, but that do apply
Islamic  law to Muslims, also  fall within  the  full judicialization  framework.  Examples  in-
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and instead direct judges  to impose  classical  Islamic law according to
the schools  that the citizens  follow.  Ostensibly, judges  who  are non-
specialists  in Islamic  law render decisions according to juristic formu-
lations  as found in classical written  texts and/or summarized for easy
consumption  in  the  modern  period.  This arrangement  results  in  a
formally narrow scope  of discretion  (restricted to the scope  of classi-
cal Islamic law for particular legal schools)  that is very broad in prac-
tice  (from  the  indeterminacy  of  that  law).  Critics  complain  that
judges  use this broad interpretive  discretion  to issue  rulings unfavor-
able  to women in areas of family law.
12
5  This  is no doubt exacerbated
by the fact that most judges and jurists in the Gulf follow a conserva-
tive brand of Islamic law with governmental  support.  Without codifi-
cation,  Islamic  family  law has  no popular legislative  origin, and with
full judicialization  of its  content,  there  is  no  review.  As  discussed
above concerning  the attempts  to de-codify Iraqi family law, this con-
stitutional scheme differs markedly from that of Iraq.
1 26
3.  Coordinate Constitutionalization
Other Islamic constitutional systems that are more attentive  to the
demands  of procedural  democracy  have  codified  family  law  codes
and seek to incorporate  Islamic law through the political process, the
judicial process, or some combination  of both.  In political terms, the
contribution of jurists occurs at the stage  of a law's formation  in the
legislature, while  in judicial terms, the contribution  is at the stage  of
judicial review.  The  following  two  examples  of Egypt and  Morocco
illustrate  these  differences,  showing  how  the government's  relation-
ship with the jurists may be formal  or informal, amicable or strained.
In Egypt (a purportedly  constitutional, presidential democracy),  gov-
ernmental-juristic  relations are strained and informal, with most fam-
ily  law  developments  occurring  at  the judicial  level;  in  Morocco  (a
purportedly constitutional,  democratic  monarchy)  they are  amicable
clude many African countries like Nigeria  (Maliki)  and the Gambia  (M5liki),  as well as Is-
rael  (Hanafi).
125  See,  e.g.,  Bahrain:  Controversy over Reform for Family Law, ARAB  REFORM  BULL.  (Carnegie
Endowment  for  Int'l  Peace,  Wash.  D.C.),  Nov.  2005,  at  8,  http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/files/fullissue-nov055.pdf  (noting  efforts to  reform  family law  in  Bah-
rain through a push for codification).
126  See the discussion  on codification  and the failed attempt to de-codify family  law through
Resolution  137, supra notes 67-75 and accompanying  text (distinguishing the Iraqi system
from  Gulf-style uncodified systems).
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The Egyptian legal system  is an example of a system that functions
under  a  regime  of judicialization,
1 2 8  directing  the  courts  to  resolve
disputes over textual interpretation of codified Islamic personal status
laws.
12 9  In  Egypt, judges  rule  on the  basis  of secular  standards,  and
only when required to draw upon Islamic law as a residual source  do
they consider consulting the jurists.
130  This arrangement  excludes the
jurists.  Judges are concerned with judicial independence  and auton-
omy, and their desire  to  avoid resorting to  the jurists becomes  prob-
lematic when it creates  incentives to apply a form of classical  Islamic
family law;  they maintain that the law is unambiguous, and thus there
is no need to consult the jurists formally.
13'  A further problem  is that
the  Egyptian  judiciary-one  of  the  more  independent  in  the  re-
gion-functions  under the auspices of and in support of a strong ex-
ecutive that controls larger constitutional questions, such as the scope
of Islamic  law  and  the  function  of democracy.  The judiciary  self-
consciously  limits its own  power out of deference  to a strong and in-
127  There  are  many  other  examples  that  suggest  similarities  between  the  Moroccan  and
Egyptian  models, but these  two suffice to give an overall  view of family law in Islamic con-
stitutional  democracies.  Egypt  is  the  model  of law  in  the  Arab  world,  its  laws  having
greatly  influenced  the  formation  of the  laws  of other countries  in  the  region  with  its
modem  developments  providing  a reference  point  for  other  countries.  See  generally
NATHAN J.  BROWN,  THE  RULE OF  LAW  IN  THE  ARAB WORLD:  COURTS  IN  EGYPT  AND  THE
GULF  63  (1997)  (discussing the changes  made to the Egyptian court system in the 1950s).
Morocco  is  notable  for  its recent legal  reforms  and their  positive reception  in  the local
and  international communities.
128  On the judicialization  of politics  as a global  trend, see  Ran  Hirschl,  Resituating theJudici-
alization of Politics: Bush  v. Gore  as a Global Trend, 15  CAN. J.L. &JuRIs.  191,  197  (2002)
(reviewing  the role of courts in various countries'  political developments).
129  For a description  of how this process works,  see  Stilt, supra note  22,  at 722-39, which de-
scribes  the general  narrowing  of influence  of the  Sharf'a on the law,  though  it remains
the  guiding  force-whether  codified  or uncodified-in  personal  status  laws,  which  in-
clude family-related issues.
130  Id. at 730  ("[T]he Sharia is a residual source of law to be used by ajudge if the Civil Code
is silent on a particular issue.").
131  See Stilt, supra note 22,  at 727  (noting that Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court "has  on
several  occasions  upheld  legislation  from  an Article  2  challenge  and,  while  explaining
why the  particular  law does  not violate  the  clear meaning  of a Qur'anic  provision,  has
mentioned as dicta propositions that the SCC does consider  definite in terms of meaning
and authenticity"  (citing Frank E. Vogel,  Conformity with Islamic Shari'a and Constitutional-
ity Under Article 2:  Some Issues of Theory, Practice, and Comparison, in DEMOCRACY,  THE RULE
OF LAW AND  ISLAM  527, 541-42 (Eugene  Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999))).
(Vol.  10:3ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ
trusive  state, and it prefers deference to the executive  over deference
to the jurists. 32  The ironic, and perhaps unintended, consequence  of
an independentjudiciary  and a strong executive that excludes juristic
input  is  a  self-imposed  restriction  on  reform  in  the  courts. 3 3  This
may have  a trickle-up  effect to the legislature;  absent lower-court  dis-
putes,  the  legislature  has  little  internal  reason  or justification  to  re-
solve judicial  disputes  or to create  sweeping  reforms with  respect  to
possible  developments  in  juristic  interpretations  of  Islamic  family
law.1
34  That impetus would have to come from elsewhere.
b.  Political Process
The Moroccan  system  is an  example of a regime of greater politi-
cization.  There, the government consulted  the jurists  in the process
of reformulating  the  country's  personal  status  laws.  To  be  sure,
courts will have to resolve subsequent interpretive issues, but after the
governmental-juristic  coordinate  political  process  of articulating  Is-
lamic family law, courts will have  received more express guidance for
doing so within the  confines  of Islamic  legal  precepts.  Moreover,  a
political process that orients itself toward juristic inclusion may stymie
132  See BROWN,  supra note  127, at 63 (noting that the transplant of the French legal codes was
not merely  the result  of France's  colonial  enterprise,  but a  result  of Egyptian  legal  re-
former Sanhfaii  and the judges' self-conscious  attempt to  limit their own  authority  in or-
der to provide support  for the  officially sanctioned  order:  a strong  and intrusive  state
that would withstand internal  and external pressures).
133  But see Lama Abu-Odeh,  Modernizing Muslim  Family Law:  The Case of Egypt,  37 VAND.  J.
TRANSNAT'L  L.  1043  (2004)  (arguing  that judges  defer to jurists  in  a way that  constrains
the law and that reform from  within the religious framework  is an untenable proposition
due  to  the  limits  imposed  by  classical  formulations  of Islamic  law  that reflect  a  pre-
modern patriarchal system).  Abu-Odeh suggests that for true reform  to occur, family  law
should  be  fully secularized.  Her  analysis  reflects  a view that Islamic  law  is composed  of
substantive  legal  rules only, rather than substance  and procedures  for interpretation that
may  allow jurists  to accommodate  modern  non-patriarchal  sentiments.  It  also suggests
that the rigidity of Islamic  law that belies  reform  in the Egyptian context is  unrelated  to
the judicialization  of Islamic  law.
134  Cf  Hirschl,  supra note  128,  at  214-15  (arguing  that  judicialization  makes  politicians
abandon  the deliberative  process in  favor of policy preferences, constitutes either the ju-
dicial  flouting of legislative  supremacy or legislative  abdication  of responsibility,  and-
inasmuch  as the judiciary  sets values rather than  resolves disputes-makes judicial  review
difficult to justify by the theory of the judiciary as the  "Least Dangerous Branch").  In  ef-
fect, Hirschl's argument suggests that attempts to overcome the counter-majoritarian  dif-
ficulty that attach  to judicial review,  like those of Alexander Bickel  orJohn Hart Ely, sim-
ply do not apply in  Islamic constitutional  contexts in which  the by-product of excluding
the  Fourth  Branch  is  that  the  judiciary  has  been  made  too  strong.  See  generally
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,  THE LEAST DANGEROUS  BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF  POLITICS  (2d  ed.  1962);  JOHN HART  ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DISTRUST:  A THEORY  OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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constitutional  litigation  concerning  Islamic  law  (based  on  the  non-
contradiction clause)  and may suggest mechanisms for continuing re-
form  if jurists update  the  law.13
5  That is,  if the government  continu-
ously includes jurists in the political process, it heightens the chances
that  legislative  acts  will  meet  constitutional  requirements  of adher-
ence  to  Islamic  legal  norms as well  as  to liberal  democratic  and hu-
man rights norms.
Iraq's recent experiences with Resolution  137 already parallel  the
element  of popular  involvement  in  Morocco's  pre-reform  process,
which  eventually  elicited  a  governmental  response  to  both  popular
and juristic  concerns.  Inasmuch  as  the  Moroccan  reforms  reflect
more  mature  developments  in  the  line  of popular  and juristic  in-
volvement  in legal  interpretation and articulation,  it is useful  to take
a  closer look at the  Moroccan  political process  and the substance  of
its reforms.
IV.  ALL THE KING'S MEN:  GOVERNMENT  AND JURISTS IN MOROCCAN
REFORMS
Morocco  recently passed sweeping reforms to its existing  personal
status laws
1 36 through a process that self-consciously  sought to harmo-
nize democratic  and human  rights norms with Islamic  legal norms.131
135  There is  of course the argument that juristic legal updating has stagnated, and this is  part
of the  problem with  Islamic law in the modern age.  See,  e.g.,  HALLAQ,  supra note 6, at 21.
As  Hallaq  points  out, such  stagnation  is  a  symptom  of recent  historical  contingencies,
rather  than  an  element  intrinsic  to Islamic  law.  As  discussed  below,  in  the  Moroccan
case,  it  does  not take  into  account  new  pressures  for  updating  Islamic  law  within  the
changing  face  of the Muslim  world,  in terms  of literacy,  geo-politics,  and popular agita-
tion for reform.
136  The pre-existing  code of personal  status was issued in  1956 following independence  from
France.  Mudawwanat  al-ahiuwl al-shakhsiyya  [Personal Status  Code]  (1956);  see  ISLAMIC
FAMILY  LAW  IN  A  CHANGING  WORLD:  A  GLOBAL  RESEOURCE  BOOK  179  (Abdullahi  An-
Na'im  ed.,  2002)  [hereinafter  ISLAMIC  FAMILY  LAW  RESOURCE  BOOK].  Before  that,  un-
codified, informal  Islamic law and customary law governed family law.  That law was based
on mainstream  settled  MalikT  substantive  rules  and incorporated  some  provisions  from
other schools along with legislation from neighboring countries.
137  Mudawwanat  al-usra [Family Code] pmbl. para. 4 (2004)  (Morocco),  available  at the Official
Website of the Moroccan Justice Department, http://www.justice.gov.ma,  English transla-
tion  (unofficial),  available at  http://friendsofmorocco.org/Family%20Code.htm  (last
viewed Dec.  25,  2006)  (noting that  King Muhammad  VI directed  the  Royal Commission
to give attention  to the dictates of Islamic  law as well as  internationally recognized human
rights).  Despite  the King's assertion  that  the Code was  written  all  "in  accordance  with
certain provisions of the Mdliki  School,"  id. pmbl, it, too, draws on other schools.  For ex-
ample, its provisions have no guardian requirement for a woman  entering into a first-time
marriage, in accordance  with Hanafi and Shi'  law,  and inserts the requirement  from ShT'!
law of witnesses  to perfect  a divorce;  neither of these  are  mainstream  Malikl positions.
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The  new  Moroccan  Family  Code, 3  like  the  old,  centers  on  settled
rules  of  Mdliki  law,  but  it  includes  non-M5liki  provisions  and  was
drafted-according to the King-with a purposive approach designed
to  underscore  values  of equality,  tolerance,  and  fairness.'39  The  re-
sulting  Code  contains  several  substantive  changes  for which  wom-
en's groups, international  NGOs, and others have praised  it as an ex-
ample  of  "progressive"  personal  status  laws  within  an  Islamic
framework. 141
Whether  Morocco's  Code  is  indeed  "progressive,"  by  whatever
standard  one would measure  the term, is not the central point of this
discussion  concerning  Islamic  constitutionalism.  We  can  assume
some satisfaction amongst Moroccans with the mostly positive  domes-
tic response.
This  is  confirmed  by Aboubakr Jamai,  Moroccan journalist and  editor, who interviewed
some of the legislators and jurists who sat on the reform commission.  Personal Commu-
nication with AboubakrJamai,  Publisher, LeJournal Hebdomadaire  (Jan. 23,  2006).
138  Mudawwanat al-usra [Family Code] pmbl. para. 4 (Morocco).
139  See id. pmbl. paras. 4-5 (stressing the values placed on  ijtihad (juridical reasoning)).
140  The  Code  reforms  several  of the most  contentious  issues  for Islamic  family  law  in  the
modern  day, the four main areas  covering marriage,  divorce, child  custody, and  inheri-
tance.  The changes  to marriage  and divorce regulations  are most extensive.  For exam-
ple, the new Code replaced the minimum marriage  age for females  (which  was fifteen for
females  and eighteen  for males)  with  a  minimum age  of eighteen  for both genders,  id.
art.  19, yet permits  the judge  to  reduce  this age  in  certain justified  cases,  id. art. 20.  As
noted, it  also does away with  the mandatory guardianship  requirement  entirely.  Id. arts.
24-25  ("marital tutelage is the woman's right.").  It limits polygamy without banning it to-
tally.  Id. pmbl.;  id. arts. 40-42.  It disposes of the  Maliki-specific version  of a wifely duty to
obey  her husband,  replacing  it  with  a  scheme  of  mutual  rights  and  duties  between
spouses.  Id. arts. 26-29, 51,  168,  194-196.  Finally, it places the overall  institution  of "pri-
vate" marriage  and its dissolution  within  the framework  of the state  and its legal  institu-
tions-requiring divorce  to occur within, and be registered by, the courts, id. arts. 78-79,
124,  restricting  the  man's  typical  prerogative  under  classical  Islamic  law  to  initiate  di-
vorce, id. arts. 90,  91-93, and granting women  new rights of divorce-initiation,  id. arts. 89,
96,98,114-115.
141  Some  Moroccan  organizations  and parties include,  among others,  L'Association  d~moc-
ratique des Femmes  do  Maroc  (Moroccan  feminist organization),  Hizb al-'adl  wa  al-ihsan
(Islamist political  party), Jam5'at al-'Adl wa al-Ihsdn  (Islamist foundation  that  is the non-
political counterpart  to the  political  party), and Pritemps  de l'Egalit4  (Moroccan  human
rights  organization  instrumental  in  bringing  about  the  reforms).  For  descriptions  of
many of these groups and their reactions, see Wendy Kristianasen,  Islam's Women Fight  for
Their Rights, LE  MONDE  DIPLOMATIQUE,  Apr.  2004,  http://mondediplo.com/2004/04/
02islamicwomen.  Organizations  outside  of Morocco  include  Vital  Voices  (U.S.-based
women's  rights  group),  http://www.vitalvoices.org  (last viewed Jan.  3,  2006),  and  The
Clinton  Foundation,  http://wvw.clintonglobalinitiative.org  (last viewed  Dec. 24,  2006).
The Code  has been  criticized  as well.  See,  e.g., Jamila Bargach,  An Ambiguous Discourse  of
Rights:  The 2004 Family Law Reform in Morocco, 3  HAWWA 245, 261-63  (2005)  (criticizing
the Code's  failure to protect the rights  of mothers who have children out of wedlock and
children who are born out of wedlock).
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Rather, the  contribution  that the  Moroccan  experiment can  pro-
vide  to  considerations  of  Islamic  constitutionalism  is  to  underscore
the  paramount  importance  of the  process  by which  Islamic  legal  re-
form  was  carried  out  to  the  broad  satisfaction  of the  people.  The
unique maneuver here was the King's establishment of a commission
to  propose  legislative  reforms,  which  comprised  both  jurists  and
Members  of Parliament.
Morocco's  recent  history in  the area  of Islamic family law  illumi-
nates  how this scheme came about.  In 1992,  the Moroccan NGO Un-
ion  de  l'Action  Feminine  (UAF)  gathered  one  million  signatures
from  men and women  in  favor of certain  reforms  in  personal  status
laws. 
14  In  1993,  the  Parliament  amended  the  law  in various  ways.
43
But  the  changes  did not go  far enough  and  UAF continued  to  rally
governmental  and popular support from  the King, Parliament Mem-
bers,  imams,  lawyers,  the  media,  and  the  Moroccan  citizenry  at
large.  As these debates  played out in Parliament and on the streets,
government  reformists  argued  back and  forth with  Islamists and ju-
rist-backed  opposition  over the  nature  of reforms.  The jurists criti-
cized  the  government  secularists'  proposed  project  of "Integrating
Women  in Economic  Development" because,  in  their view,  the pro-
ject  did  not relate  to  Islamic  legal  norms. 45  The jurists viewed  the
project  as  a  threat to  the  country's  Islamic  identity  and  turned  the
conflict into a debate  over the role of Islamic law in legislation. 4 6  As
is  common  in  debates  about  the  rule  of  Islamic  law,  the  conflict
turned into one of identity politics.
When viewed against the outcome of the recent reforms,  clearly, a
key  issue in  the  debate  was whether  and what role the jurists would
play in the reforms.  The disputes over the proposed  reforms came to
a head on the street.  In the spring of 2000, over 300,000  demonstra-
tors supported  the secular  reform  proposal  ("Integrating Women  in
Economic  Development")  at a rally  in  Rabat.
14 7  At  the same  time,  a
comparable  number  protested  the  proposal  as  a  deviation  from
142  Clinton  Global  Initiative,  Fueling  Reform:  Moroccan  Family  Law  as a  Model-in-Action
2005  (Commitment  Announcement),  http://commitments.clintonglobalinitiative.org/
projects.htm?mode=view&rid=43241  (last viewed  Feb. 29, 2008)  [hereinafter Fueling  Re-
form].
143  See IsLAMIic  FAMILY  LAW RESOURCE BOOK,  supra note  136,  at 179  (describing the  amend-
ments).
144  Fueling Reform,  supra note 142.
145  Bargach, supra note  141,  at 253.
146  Id.
147  Hajjar, supra  note 60, at 233.
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proper  Islamic  legal  norms.14 8  In  so  doing,  they demonstrated,  for
the first time, the massive force of the Islamist and juristic elements in
Morocco  and  of the  legitimizing  effect  of asserting an  Islamic  legal
identity.
149 Something had to be done.
The King intervened, seeking  to ameliorate  the tensions in a way
that would  attend  to  the  concerns  of both  the  secularists  and  the
Islamists.  In April  2001,  he  halted the  purely secular  governmental
reform projects  and convened  a reform  commission  with a  mandate
to resolve  the secularist-Islamist/juristic  differences  and propose mu-
tually agreeable  reforms for personal  status laws.
1
5  He  appointed  a
cross  section of committee  members  drawn from groups of men and
women with expertise that ranged from the political  (lobbyists, politi-
cians,  and  women's  rights  activists  from  the  Printemps  de  l'Egalit6
NGO umbrella  group) to  the scholarly  (including jurists-both  men
and  women-who  were  traditionally  trained  at  the  Qarawiyyin  ma-
drasa  in Fez).5'  Two-and-a-half years later, the Committee finished its
work.  On October  10,  2003,  the King announced  the family  law  re-
form  proposal  and introduced  it  to  Parliament  for consideration.  1 52
On January  25,  2004,  the  Moroccan  National Assembly  adopted  the
bill with minor revisions.
53
Though  the  Committee  did not explicitly disclose  their interpre-
tive deliberations,  the King's  introductory remarks accompanying the
Code and certain features  of the Code itself suggest particular inter-
pretive methods that the Committee may have  employed.  Regardless
of whether Islamic  law  was  their starting  point, the  extent  to which
the  Commission  couched  reforms  in  the  language  of Islamic  law  is
notable.  In large part, the Code reads like a family law chapter from
a classical  law compendium,  systematically  listing each  topic roughly
in the same order as do classical  works of fiqh.  Symbolically,  this sig-
nals an attempt to couch  the reforms in  terms of classical Islamic law
and  to  avoid  a method  of legal  reform  (common  elsewhere  in  the
Middle  East)  that adopts Western templates  of law upon which a ve-
148  Id.
149  Bargach, supranote  141,  at 253.
150  Id.
151  Id.  at 253 n.12 and accompanying  text; see also Women's Learning  Partnership for Rights,
Development,  and Peace,  Morocco  Adopts  Landmark  Family  Law  Supporting Women's
Equality,  Feb.  24,  2004,  http://www.leamingpartnership.org/en/advocacy/alerts/
morocco0204  (describing the process of adopting the new family law).
152  Zineb Touimi-Benjelloun,  A  New Family Law in  Morocco:  "Patience  Is Bitter, but Its Fruit Is
Sweet,"  UN  DEv.  FUND  FOR  WOMEN,  Dec.  19,  2003,  http://www.unifem.org/gender
_issues/voicesfromthe.field/story.php?StoryID=264.
153  Women's Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace,  supra note  151.
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neer of Islamic legal language  is  placed.15  Instead,  the  Committee's
interpretive strategies  center around  five approaches  that mix classi-
cal  Islamic  and  modern  democratic  norms:  reinterpreting  key
Qur'anic verses  and  hIadlth, applying  universal  legal  maxims  that re-
flect  the  spirit  of  Islamic  law,
1 5  adopting  minority  MlikT  opinions
along with  rules from other legal schools, re-categorizing  certain fiqh
provisions  to  create  new rights  and  legal  remedies  for  women,  and
overlaying Islamic provisions with state institutional and international
norms, especially  in areas where Islamic law is silent.15
Although  Morocco  does not offer  an  exact  parallel  to  Iraq,  it is
useful  in the  discussion of actual institutional  arrangements under a
regime  of  coordinate  Islamic  constitutionalism.  Morocco  differs
from Iraq in that it is a monarchic democracy rather than a presiden-
tial one; its Muslim population  is majority Sunni with a Shl'! minority
rather  than  majority  ShV!  with  a  Sunni  minority;  and  it follows  the
Mdliki school  of the African-Islamic  tradition  rather than the  ShVT  or
Hanafi traditions of Iraq. 5 7  Nevertheless,  its experiment is  instructive
for  understanding  new issues  of Islamic  constitutionalism  inasmuch
154  An  example  is the Tunisian summary excision  of polygamy  from its law books.  Note that
the Committee's  reticence to invalidate  polygamy summarily, see supra note  140, does  not
necessarily signal  its comfort with the practice.  Rather, they seem to heed the notion that
following  a methodology  and speaking in  terms of Islamic law provides the best means of
successful  and lasting reform,  and thereby  may be exportable  to countries committed  to
applying some form of Islamic law in the context of Islamic constitutionalism.  According
to some traditionally  trained  expert jurists, there are  some legal bases  for prohibition  of
polygamy outright  that have  been  recently advanced,  but the arguments  in favor of that
position have yet to gain traction  in the grammar of Islamic law.
155  For instance, in  expanding women's options  to  initiate divorce on  the ground  of harm
inflicted  by  her  spouse,  it  "endorse[s]  the  general  legal  principle  [that  a  legal  agent
should]  'neither harm  nor be  harmed'  to promote  equality and equity between  the  two
spouses."  Mudauwanat al-usra [Family Code]  pmbl.  (2004)  (Morocco);  id, art.  89.  The
quoted  language  is one of five  universal  Islamic legal  maxims.  Another  example  is  the
Code's changes  to certain  marriage  guidelines  for residents  abroad  to facilitate  recogni-
tion  of those marriages  in Moroccan courts.  Id.  This  is  based on the maxim that "hard-
ship brings about facilitation."  For a discussion of these and other Islamic universal  legal
maxims, see generally Wolfhart Heinrichs,  Qawi 'id as a Genre of Legal Literature, in STUDIES
IN  ISLAMIC  LEGAL THEORY 365  (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002).
156  The  Code distinguishes between  principles derived  from  Islamic law  (by use of the term
shar't  from  principles that  issue from  state  law  (by  use of the  term  qdm~nfi)  in  order to
clarify areas where  the basis of the law is secular (i.e.,  fact-based  or contingent and there-
fore not within  the  full jurisdiction  of Islamic  law)  and  thereby justify  arbitrary  stipula-
ions.  For example, it uses the "state" age  of legal majority  to set the age of majority at
eighteen  for both genders.  Mudawwanat al-usra [Family Code] art.  19.  (Morocco).
157  One objection  to  the view  of Morocco as  a model  is  that the charismatic  monarch there
makes all  the difference  in driving legal  change.  Yet this feature of the Moroccan system
is one  means that the different branches are  forced to coordinate;  arguably it  is not the
only means.
[Vol.  10:3ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ
as it offers insight into the workings  of a coordinate  model of consti-
tutionalization  that  has  been  acclaimed  a  success  both  domestically
and internationally.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Islamic  law  is  a complex  legal  system,  and  its incorporation  into
modern state structures  demands  a unique institutional arrangement
for interpreting the law.  Once a constitution has declared Islamic  law
to  be  a  source  of  legislation  or  enshrines  an  Islamic  law  non-
contradiction  clause,  political leaders  and other interested  actors de-
termine how legal  processes will play out.  Central  issues include  the
scope  of consideration  afforded  Islamic  law in  the constitutional  in-
corporation,  the nature and substance of the law in the context of Is-
lamic constitutionalism,  and the governmental decision-makers  in the
realm  of legislation  and adjudication  vis-A-vis  the jurists who  typically
are popularly recognized  as the historically competent interpreters of
Islamic law.
A useful  analysis  of Islamic  constitutionalism  moves  beyond  the
question  of whether Islam and democracy are compatible,  or whether
Islamic  law  is  compatible  with  democratic  notions  concerning  the
rule  of law.  Theoretical  proposals and historical  trends suggest that
they are, and for three reasons, pragmatic concerns require  modes of
discussing  how  they  are.  First,  Islamic  constitutionalism  inevitably
contemplates  some  role for  the jurists, as  historically  they  have  en-
joyed  the  epistemic  authority  and  training  that  grants  them  legiti-
macy and competence  to interpret  Islamic  law or approve  Islamic  le-
gal  interpretations.  The  Constitution  brings  the  positivist  rule  of
recognition  to  bear  in  full  force  with  reference  to  Islamic  legal
norms.  Second, jurists are individual  or corporate members of a de-
mocratic  polity whose voices  play a role  in  democratic participation.
In some sense,  they too form a part of "We the  People," inasmuch  as
their corporate members appeal  to them and defer to their decisions.
Finally,  the juristic  class  is  often  a central  component to  Islamic  law
and practice, and to legal reform  as well perhaps, because of a signifi-
cant amount of popular legitimacy.  Jurists  themselves  often assert  a
right to play a role in, or at least monitor, Islamic legal interpretation
that, with  their popular  support,  it has  been  politically  difficult  for
governments to deny. All these factors  indicate thatjurists  comprise a
type  of Fourth  Branch to  an  Islamic constitutional  government;  that
is,  their very  presence  coupled  with  a  constitutional  clause  incorpo-
rating  Islamic  law  demands  the  constitutionally  constructed  three
branches to negotiate a certain relationship with them.  This relation-
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ship ranges  from exclusion to dominance, and in its best iterations, it
is coordinate.  In  short, it is  an  unavoidable  conclusion  that by the
terms of Islamic constitutional  clauses  and related  political theories,
jurists  matter  for  law  and  governance  in  Islamic  constitutional  re-
gimes  like  Iraq.  With  this in  mind,  contemplating  Islamic  constitu-
tionalism  requires attention  to  the jurists and their interpretive  me-
thods.
In addition, recent  history suggests at least two ways  in which  the
exclusion  of jurists may  be  harmful.  First, exclusion  typically  brings
about opposition  that tends  to foment fundamentalism  in  the name
of a return to Islamic legitimacy.  Here, identity politics  may prolifer-
ate  in  the  form  of  suppressed  sentiments  amongst  a  population
quelled  by  a  strong  government  and  weak  democratic  institutions
that fail to protect individual rights; it may create  violent unrest.  Or,
if fundamentalist  proponents of Islamic law manage to gain power, it
may  emerge in  the form of Islamic  law  that is imposed from the top
down,  without any power-sharing or checks  and balances  at all.  This
latter scenario describes countries where there is formal constitution-
alization of Islamic law but weak democratic structures.
Second,  exclusion  actually  may  prevent  political  and judicial  re-
form.  This  possibility  describes  countries  where  there  is  either in-
formal  or coordinate  constitutionalization  of Islamic  law, but where
judges who  have  no  Islamic  law expertise  have  been  empowered  to
interpret the law without adequate interpretive tools for doing so.  In
such  cases,  they  tend  to  crystalize  the  law  without attempting juris-
prudential methods to reform it, and exclude  the jurists equipped  to
do  so  (if they  are  so  inclined-which  is,  admittedly,  quite  another
question.)  In  other words, judges,  if not the  institutional  arrange-
ment itself, bind  their own  hands.  In  such  situations,  the  state  has
constitutionalized  Islamic  law,  but the  institutional arrangement  has
removed legitimate methods for its dynamic growth or reform  by ex-
cluding  Islamic  law  experts  from  the  interpretive  project.  To  pre-
serve  a strong executive and an independent judiciary, judges, politi-
cians,  and  the  executive  alike  in  such  systems  support  this
arrangement  and  thereby  squeeze  out popular  calls for  change.  In
short, the judicialization  of Islamic  law  without  professional juristic
expertise  prevents,  rather  than  encourages,  legal  reform  on  Islamic
grounds.
For democratic  and rights interests,  the  best outcomes in  Islamic
constitutionalism  seem  to  emerge  when  the  government  acknowl-
edges  the  presence  of  the jurists  and  sets  up  an  institutional  ar-
rangement whereby  it works with them in a coordinate fashion.  Do-
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ing so places control over law in  the democratic sovereign,  complete
with checks  and balances, and encourages  the popular sentiments of
"We the People" to balance  against the expertise  of "We the Jurists."
While it has several differences from the Iraqi situation, Morocco and
its recent family law reforms at least can be seen as an example of this
trend.  Each Islamic constitutional country will be different in the way
that it  negotiates  this  task along  with  the  differences  in  the  religio-
political  and demographic  makeup, transnational  influences, juristic
interpretive  methods, and institutional  legacy that its jurists and citi-
zenry bring  to the  table.  Iraq-with  its mixed SunnT-Shi'T  and non-
Muslim  population,  together with  its majority  ShT'T jurists'  sturdy in-
stitutional presence  and  their strong  living tradition  of Islamic  legal
interpretation-will  have  to work out its  own answers to  Islamic con-
stitutionalism's  four  questions  raised  in  this Article.  As  it does  so,
Iraq will no doubt carefully consider, in coordination with the juristic
Fourth  Branch,  the  institutional  arrangement  and  the  interpretive
mandate for its government.
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